

Report Documentation Page

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.

1. REPORT DATE 04-02-10	2. REPORT TYPE Master's Thesis	3. DATES COVERED 08-01-09 to 04-02-10		
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Complacency in the Face of Islamic Radicalism			5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
			5b. GRANT NUMBER	
			5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR (S) Lieutenant Colonel Matthew E. Travis, US Marine Corps			5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
			5e. TASK NUMBER	
			5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME (S) AND ADDRESS (ES) National Defense University, Joint Forces Staff College, 7800 Hampton Blvd, Norfolk, VA, 23511-1702			8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME (S) AND ADDRESS (ES)			10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM (S)	
			11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER (S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited				
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES				
14. ABSTRACT Osama Bin Laden declared war in 1996 against Americans occupying the “land of the two holy places.” The Worldwide Islamic Front declared war against the United States in 1998. Islamic radical leaders desire to kill millions of Americans by first lulling the West into a sense of complacency, and they think they can get the United States there via the murky waters of ignorance, apathy, and a lack of moral clarity, leaving America vulnerable to catastrophic attacks. United States national leaders seemingly refuse to acknowledge the commitment of Islamic radicalism’s intentions, and this failure is crippling America’s efforts to develop a strategy to counter these Islamic radicals. If the American people and her leaders do not take this threat seriously, devise an enduring strategy, and commit sufficient resources to fight it, the next 9-11 will be more devastating than the last. This thesis will assess national policy, expenditure of national power, and public support of the “War on Terror” from 2001 to present day. Analysis will assess public support for the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, but also attitudes concerning related domestic activities. This paper will show that Islamic radicalism presents a formidable threat to America. It will analyze United States strategy to counter Islamic radicalism. The author will analyze American attitudes from 2001 to 2010 in order to survey complacency in the face of this threat, and show that public support for war is strong when the case is well explained, but that this support is perishable, and that it must be sustained by national leadership.				
15. SUBJECT TERMS				
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:		17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT Unclassified Unlimited	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 83	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT Unclassified	b. ABSTRACT Unclassified			c. THIS PAGE Unclassified

**JOINT FORCES STAFF COLLEGE
JOINT ADVANCED WARFIGHTING SCHOOL**

COMPLACENCY IN THE WEST IN THE FACE OF ISLAMIC RADICALISM

by

Matthew E. Travis

Lieutenant Colonel, United States Marine Corps



A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Joint Advanced Warfighting School in partial satisfaction of the requirements of a Master of Science Degree in Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy. The contents of this paper reflect my personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Joint Forces Staff College or the Department of Defense.

This paper is entirely my own work except as documented in footnotes.

Signature: _____

2 April 2010

Thesis Adviser: James B. Miller, Colonel, United States Marine Corps

Abstract

Al Qaeda's infamous leader, Osama Bin Laden, declared war in 1996 against Americans occupying the "land of the two holy places." The Worldwide Islamic Front declared war against the United States in 1998, stating that the killing of Americans was the individual duty of Muslims everywhere. Shortly after 9-11, Bin Laden announced the future destruction of America. Iran's Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, remarked, "The Iranian people have been defeating America for the past twenty-five years. The world of Islam has been mobilized against America for the past twenty-five years. The people call, 'Death to America.'" Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has repeatedly referenced the destruction of Israel since taking office in 2005. Islamic radical leaders desire to kill millions of Americans by first lulling the West into a sense of complacency, and they think they can get the United States there via the murky waters of ignorance, apathy, and a lack of moral clarity, leaving America vulnerable to catastrophic attacks. Such was the case when the Christmas day 2009 bomber incident occurred on Delta flight 253 from Amsterdam to Detroit. United States national leaders seemingly refuse to acknowledge the commitment of Islamic radicalism's intentions, and this failure is crippling America's efforts to develop a strategy to counter these Islamic radicals' evil message. If the American people and her leaders do not take the threat of Islamic radicalism seriously, devise an enduring strategy, work with international partners, and commit sufficient resources to fight it, the next 9-11 will be more devastating than the last. The attacks of 9-11 killed thousands. Al Qaeda would like to kill millions, and if they could acquire a nuclear bomb, they could do it easily. This thesis will assess national policy, expenditure of national power, and public support of the "War on Terror" from 2001 to present day. Analysis will assess public support for the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, but also attitudes concerning tighter airport security measures, restricted immigration, freezing assets with suspected terror links, and monitoring what is being taught in America's classrooms, and her universities. The goals of Islamic radicalism include extraordinary alternatives to the current world order, which include the destruction of America and Israel, and the realization of a Muslim Caliphate on earth. This paper will show that the threat of Islamic radicalism is organized, well-funded, and although they have been degraded, they present a formidable threat to America and are desperately working to target her extraordinarily and lethally. The second chapter will analyze the United States strategy to counter Al Qaeda, the perpetrators of 9-11, and Islamic Radicalism. Analysis will primarily answer the question whether or not United States national leadership has adequately assessed the threat of Islamic Radicalism and, if so, have they developed a strategy to fight it? The most critical issue uncovered in the strategy is that the national security debate about the ideological character of this war is not being conducted, seemingly for fear of discussing the sensitive, religious nature of these radicals' ideology, which is based in the Koran, the Hadith, and the life and history of the Prophet Mohammed. The author will analyze American attitudes from 2001 to 2010 in order to survey complacency in the face of this threat, and show that public support for war is strong when the case is well explained, but that this support is perishable, and that it must be sustained by national leadership.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank author Lawrence Wright for coming to Camp Pendleton, California in the autumn of 2007 and telling the *Looming Tower* story. *Looming Tower and the Road to 9-11*, more than any other book, was what inspired me to delve further into what Osama Bin Laden stands for, the ideological basis for Al Qaeda's existence and extraordinary goals, and Islam radicalism's growing threat to the United States and to the West.

Next, I would like to thank Colonel J.B. Miller, United States Marine Corps, for guiding me through the thesis process, and Dr. Gail Nicula, Mrs. Jeanette Spurling, and the library staff at the Joint Forces Staff College for research and technical assistance.

Lastly, and most importantly, I owe a special thanks to my bride for her prayers, patience, and support while I wrote this paper.

Table of Contents

Introduction		1
Chapter One	The Threat of Islamic Radicalism	11
Chapter Two	United States Strategy to Counter Islamic Radicalism	29
Chapter Three	Public Support	56
Conclusion		65

Introduction

“We will direct every resource at our command – every means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every instrument of law enforcement, every financial influence, and every necessary weapon of war – to the disruption and to the defeat of the global terror network.”¹

President George W. Bush’s statement to Congress came just nine days following the attacks of 11 September 2001. Shortly thereafter, Al-Qaeda’s leader, Osama Bin Laden, announced the future destruction of America.² Bin Laden first declared war in 1996 against Americans occupying the “land of the two holy places,”³ a sentiment echoed today against Israel by current Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad.⁴ Bin Laden’s post-9-11 declaration was merely another taunt by an Islamic radical leader. The Worldwide Islamic Front declared war against the United States in 1998, stating that the killing of Americans was the individual duty of Muslims everywhere,⁵ and Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, has remarked, “The Iranian people have been defeating America for the past twenty-five years. The world of Islam has been mobilized against

¹ U.S. President. Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress of the United States, “Response to the Terrorist Attacks of September 11,” September 20, 2001, Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents (September 21, 2001), http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=2001_presidential_documents&docid=pd24se01_txt-26 (accessed 21 October 2009): 1349.

² Stephen Lambert, *Y: The Sources of Islamic Revolutionary Conduct* [Washington: Center for Strategic Intelligence Research, 2005], 129; citation from Los Angeles Times (7 October 2001), http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-100701binladen_text.story.

³ Bin Laden, Osama. “Declaration of Jihad by Osama Bin Laden against the US - August 23, 1996.” Terrorismfiles.org, http://www.terrorismfiles.org/individuals/declaration_of_jihad1.html (accessed 21 October 2009).

⁴ “Ahmadinejad’s Threats to Destroy Israel,” Queen of Swords, <http://queenofswords.wordpress.com/2007/03/08/ahmadinejads-threats-to-destroy-israel/> (accessed 21 October 2009).

⁵ Jim Lacey ed., *The Canons of Jihad: Terrorists’ Strategy for Defeating America* [Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2008], 3.

America for the past twenty-five years. The people call, ‘Death to America.’”⁶ These and other Islamic radical leaders desire to kill millions of Americans by first lulling the West into complacency via ignorance, apathy, and a lack of moral clarity,⁷ leaving America vulnerable to catastrophic attacks while promoting their vitriolic anti-American message.

A case in point is the 2009 Christmas day bomber incident on Delta flight 253 from Amsterdam to Detroit, which clearly illustrates that defensive mechanisms devised since 2001 remain suspect.⁸ The tragedy of 9-11 could have repeated itself that day because information received by United States intelligence services was not processed fast enough to prevent the attack. Fortunately, an alert Dutch passenger heroically prevented disaster prior to landing in Detroit. President Obama, on 7 January 2010, released an unclassified report on the attempted attack which concluded that the Government’s counterterrorism operations had been caught off guard by the sophistication and strength of an Al-Qaida cell in Yemen, which is where, officials say, the plot against the United States originated.⁹

Unfortunately, these types of attacks will continue. Seemingly, despite repeated and horrific attacks against Americans both at home and abroad, America has grown complacent. Consider the Hasan massacre at Fort Hood, Texas on 5 November 2009, which left 13 dead and 43 wounded. It was not until 15 January 2010, over two months

⁶ Joel Rosenberg, *Inside the Revolution: How the Followers of Jihad, Jefferson, and Jesus are Battling to Dominate the Middle East and Transform the World* [Carol Stream, IL: Tyndale House Publishers, 2009], 156.

⁷ Ibid., xiv.

⁸ George Friedman, “The Christmas Day Airliner Attack and the Intelligence Process,” Stratfor Global Intelligence, 4 January 2010. http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20100104_christmas_day_airliner_attack_and_intelligence (accessed 8 January 2010).

⁹ Wire reports, “Obama Orders Reforms After Security Failures,” *The Virginia Pilot*, 8 January 2010, 8.

later, that the Obama Administration would even characterize the incident as an act of terror, and the official that did so remained anonymous when he or she spoke to reporters at the Pentagon, stating that he or she was only providing insight into the Administration's discussions about the incident.¹⁰ Major Nidal Hasan, Medical Corps, United States Army, had frequently sent electronic messages (emails) to a radical Yemeni-American cleric, Anwar al-Aulaqi. Aulaqi has consistently espoused violent extremism and has been named in terror trials in three cities in America and in Canada.¹¹ Defenders of the Administration would submit that this omission was due to the investigation of the tragedy. This paper argues otherwise; national leaders refuse to acknowledge the commitment of Islamic radicalism's intentions, and this failure is crippling United States' efforts to develop a comprehensive strategy to counter their inflammatory, evil message.

Growing domestic concerns (stagnant economy, unemployment, growing trade imbalance, shrinking national security budget, health care reform, natural disasters, environmental concerns, immigration challenges, domestic violence and gang problems) conspire to distract America from this lethal threat. Balancing political and fiscal realities with an appropriate sense of the current global security challenge requires patient endurance, comprehensive analysis and is an extremely tough task. On one hand, the President is committed to an extremely ambitious domestic agenda. On the other, less than nine years ago, America suffered its largest and most deadly attack ever when 2,973

¹⁰ Justin Fishel and Catherine Herridge, "Obama Official Calls 'Fort Hood Massacre' Act of Terror," Fox News, 15 January 2010. <http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2010/01/15/time-obama-official-calls-fort-hood-massacre-act-terrorism/?test=latestnews> (accessed 15 January 2010).

¹¹ Spencer S. Hsu, "Hasan's Ties to Radical Cleric Raise Issues for Law Enforcement," *The Washington Post*, 18 November 2009. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/11/17/AR2009111703830.html> (accessed 15 January 2010).

died on 9-11. Since that day the United States has had some successes, and Al Qaeda is on the run, but it is far from being contained, neutralized, or defeated, and their leadership remains committed to targeting the United States.¹² Regardless, pressing domestic problems are no excuse for not countering the Islamic radicalism's message. Despite massive public support for prosecuting a war against Al Qaeda following 9-11 and considerable expenditure of national resources to defeat them since, United States public support has sunk to an incredible 39% in support of continuing the fight in Afghanistan.¹³ Some United States national leaders have seemingly decided that Al Qaeda has been dealt a severe enough blow, and voiced such views during the three month period in which the President considered the "troop request" in support of ongoing operations in Afghanistan. President Obama's lengthy decision making process left time to debate between continuing a counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy or adopting a counterterrorism (CT) approach. The President's decision to send 30,000 troops is a hopeful sign that he is committed to success in defeating the Taliban's strategy to destabilize Afghanistan's government, and to force the United States and its allies to withdraw; it is certainly a positive development. Questions about America's resolve persist. Is enough being done, not just overseas, but here at home? Are sufficient resources being committed? Critics state that too many lives have been lost (5,308 servicemen killed in action to date in Iraq or Afghanistan in support of either Operation Iraqi Freedom or Operation Enduring Freedom¹⁴) and that the cost has grown too high

¹² Robert Burns and Lolita C. Baldor, "New Attacks Make Plain Al Qaeda's Resolve," *The Virginian Pilot*, 9 January 2010, 6.

¹³ Paul Steinhauser, "Poll: Support for Afghan war at all-time low," *Cable News Network*, 15 September 2009. <http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/09/15/afghan.war.poll/index.html> (accessed 18 January 2010).

¹⁴ Faces of the Fallen, *The Washington Post*. <http://projects.washingtonpost.com/fallen/iraq/page2/> (accessed 18 January 2010).

(\$159B war funding in fiscal year (FY) 2011 budget and \$33B in the FY10 supplemental alone)¹⁵ to continue the fight overseas. They maintain that more important domestic priorities warrant our attention and that this eight year war has gone on too long.

In this war, how effective has the United States Government been at using all instruments of national power? They have frozen the financial assets of individuals and groups with suspected ties to terror groups and placed economic sanctions against state sponsors of terror. They have persistently communicated the message to the Muslim world that this war is not against Islam, but against terrorists who distort Islam's message to rationalize their destructive attacks. They have enhanced law enforcement efforts by increasing surveillance of suspicious individuals in the United States. One example is the arrest and 22 July 2009 indictment of the so-called "North Carolina Jihad Cell" for "conspiracy to provide material support to terrorists" and "conspiracy to murder persons abroad."¹⁶ The United States Government has toppled two authoritarian regimes and continues to fight two counterinsurgency campaigns with 160,000 troops still fighting in Iraq and in Afghanistan,¹⁷ helping both nations establish a democratic style of government that can lead, defend, and foster greater prosperity for their people. They continue to pressure Pakistan's leadership to do more to target Muslim extremists in their western border region. Twenty-three terror plots have been foiled since 2001¹⁸ due to

¹⁵ Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates and Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, "JCS Speech: FY11 Budget Rollout Press Avail," 1 February 2010. <http://www.jcs.mil/speech.aspx?ID=1320> (accessed 24 March 2010).

¹⁶ "The North Carolina Jihad Cell and the Quantico Marine Base Plot," *The NEFA Foundation*, November 2009. <http://www.nefafoundation.org/targetamerica.html#quantico> (accessed 1 December 2009).

¹⁷ Jena Baker McNeill and James Jay Carafano, "Terrorist Watch: 23 Plots Foiled Since 9/11." Backgrounder #2294, The Heritage Foundation, July 2, 2009. <http://www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandSecurity/bg2294.cfm> (accessed 2 November 2009).

¹⁸ Ibid.

increased intelligence sharing both at home and abroad and intense coordination by local, state, and federal law enforcement. Yet, as the Christmas incident in Detroit shows, there is more to be done. From 2003 to 2008, the United States killed nearly 20,000 terrorists/insurgents and detained more than 25,000 terrorists/insurgents in Iraq alone.¹⁹

Despite this extensive effort, some observers would argue that only our military, not our nation, is at war. Author John Robb said it this way, “The war is being fought with limited resources on the margins of American society and economic activity.”²⁰ If so, why is the nation not more fully invested? United States national leaders and the American people apparently believe that a limited war effort is sufficient to defeat radical Islamic terrorists. They are most likely distracted with other domestic and international policy issues. America has grown complacent to the threat of Islamic radicalism. Why would America, after being repeatedly attacked by Muslim extremists bent on destroying her, be lulled to sleep in the face of this threat?

If the American people and her leaders do not take the threat of Islamic radicalism seriously, devise an enduring strategy, work with international partners, and commit sufficient resources to fight it, the next 9-11 will be more devastating and more deadly than the last. The attacks of 9-11 killed thousands. Al Qaeda would like to kill millions, and if they could acquire a nuclear bomb, they could do it easily. When asked what worries him most, former CIA Director Porter Goss listed Iran and Al Qaeda as the top two (of seven) threats to United States national security.²¹ This thesis will be a sober

¹⁹ Jim Michaels, “19,000 Insurgents Killed in Iraq Since 2003,” *USA Today*, 27 September 2007, 9.

²⁰ John Robb, *Brave New War: The Next Stage of Terrorism and the End of Globalization* [Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 2007], 70.

²¹ Joel Rosenberg, *Inside the Revolution: How the Followers of Jihad, Jefferson, and Jesus are Battling to Dominate the Middle East and Transform the World* [Carol Stream, IL: Tyndale House Publishers, 2009], 197-203; from author’s interview with Porter Goss, February 2008.

reminder that the stakes are extremely high, that the United States needs to stay vigilant, and that its national leaders and the public must persevere in the war against Islamic radicalism. When asked by Congress to describe the implications of the United States withdrawing from Afghanistan, a key front in the current war, Admiral Mullen, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff stated that this area of the world is the “epicenter of terrorism” and the Afghan people and the Pakistani people will be asking, “are you with us or not?” [in the war against the Taliban, Al Qaeda, and their extremist allies]?²² If America withdraws now before the Afghan government and security forces are sufficiently established, the Taliban will easily fill the void and establish the same authoritarian-style government that existed before 9-11. The free world knows what resulted from that, and America simply cannot afford it. Winning the war against Islamic radicalism requires staying the course, continuing to assess its strategy, allocating requisite resources, and coordinating all instruments of national power to win.

This thesis will assess national policy, expenditure of national power, and public support of the “War on Terror” from 2001 to present day. It will not be a case study of American attitudes in similar instances, like the United States attitude towards Hitler’s Germany or Imperial Japan, although some comparisons will be made. Primarily, this thesis will be limited to the post 9-11 world, and will focus on American opinions, policy, and strategy decisions, while borrowing observations from western allies such as Canada and Great Britain. Analysis will assess not only polling data showing United States public support for the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, but also attitudes concerning domestic

²² Senate Committee on Armed Services, Nomination of Admiral Michael G. Mullen, USN, for Reappointment to the Grade of Admiral and Reappointment as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, September 15, 2009, 111th Cong., 1st sess., 2009, <http://armed-services.senate.gov/Transcripts/2009/09%20September/09-61%20-%209-15-09.pdf> (accessed 21 October 2009).

actions like tighter airport security measures, restricted immigration, or freezing assets with suspected links to funding terrorism.

Recognizing American complacency in the face of Islam radicalism and in the decisions of its national leaders is a critical, yet difficult task at best. On one hand, millions of Americans are practicing Muslims who live normal lives and intend no harm to America. Americans who are Muslim need to know that the process of identifying and debating Islamic radicalism, and then constructing a strategy to counter it, is good for the entire country, and it is good for them. The proposed debate is not a quest to marginalize Islam. Clearly, Americans need to remain vigilant to recognize Islamic radicals while not alienating the greater whole. Meanwhile, Al Qaeda and other like-minded groups only have to get it right once to conduct mass killing, while America has to stay vigilant everyday to provide adequately for the common defense. As the December 2009 arrest in Pakistan of five Americans from Virginia demonstrates, there are Islamic radicals who are going to great lengths to kill, maim, and/or destroy Americans. These men are currently in Islamabad pending trial for plotting to target Pakistani government leaders for their counter terror (CT) efforts in Waziristan to defeat the Taliban.²³ Complicating this analysis is the premise that no national leader will ever confess to ‘going soft’ on terror for fear of losing votes, and though this has traditionally been a political liability for Democratic politicians, no elected official is immune from this phenomenon. Further, the war against Islamic radicalism, which comprises both nation-state and non-state actors, is going to last decades, if not generations, and there will be no victory parade; a

²³ Arwa Damon, Brian Todd, and Dugald McConnell, “Americans Arrested in Pakistan had Bright Futures,” CNN US, 11 December 2009.

<http://www.cnn.com/2009/US/12/11/pakistan.americans.profiles/index.html>, accessed 8 February 2010).

grim view for sure. In this context, complacency and distraction are a deadly combination, and both contribute to a growing sense of false security.

This thesis is comprised of three chapters. Chapter One describes the very lethal threat of Islamic radicalism to the United States of America, her people, and their way of life. The goals of Islamic radicalism include extraordinary alternatives to the current world order, and include the destruction of America and Israel, and the realization of a Muslim Caliphate on earth.²⁴ This paper will show that the threat of Islamic radicalism is organized, well-funded, and although they have been degraded,²⁵ they still present a formidable threat to America and are desperately working to target her in an extraordinary and lethal way. The second chapter will analyze the United States strategy to counter Al Qaeda, the perpetrators of 9-11, and Islamic radicalism. Analysis will primarily answer the question whether or not United States national leadership has adequately assessed the threat of Islamic radicalism and, if so, have they developed a comprehensive strategy to fight it? This chapter will evaluate the commitment of United States national leadership to winning the war. Has the strategy to win the “Global War on Terror” been well coordinated across key agencies: Defense, State, Homeland Security, Treasury, and Justice? Since 9-11, and despite the loss of over 5,300 servicemen and women²⁶, close to 36,000 casualties,²⁷ and the expenditure of close to \$950B on the war,²⁸ has America spent her national treasure wisely? The final chapter will analyze

²⁴ Stephen Lambert, *Y: The Sources of Islamic Revolutionary Conduct* [Washington: Center for Strategic Intelligence Research, 2005], 130.

²⁵ The White House, *National Security Strategy* [March 2006], 8.

²⁶ “Faces of the Fallen,” The Washington Post. <http://projects.washingtonpost.com/fallen/> (accessed 17 February 2010).

²⁷ “Honor the Fallen,” Iraq and Afghanistan Veterans of America. <http://iava.org/> (accessed 17 February 2010).

American attitudes from 2001 to 2010 in order to gauge complacency in the face of this threat. Are Americans willing to assess this threat, counter it effectively, and to pay for the effort to fight and win no matter how long it takes?

²⁸ Amy Belasco, “The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11 (RL33110),” Congressional Research Service, 15 May 2009, Table 3.
<http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/125514.pdf> (accessed 26 January 2010).

CHAPTER ONE: THE THREAT OF ISLAMIC RADICALISM

Islamic radicalism comprises numerous non-state and state actors from around the world, bound by fierce determination to bring back the glory of seventh century Islam by attacking the United States, Israel, their western, modern, and/or Judeo-Christian allies, and moderate Muslim governments. Islamic radicalism bears little resemblance to America's 20th century enemies: the Cold War's Soviet Russia, World War II's Nazi Germany/Imperial Japan/Fascist Italy Axis, and World War I's Germany/Austria-Hungary Alliance. Islamic radicalism does not have defined borders, a head of state, government institutions, an established citizenry, or professional military forces. What they do have is an overarching ideology, a multipronged strategy, decentralized leadership, thousands of determined fighters, a fundraising and recruiting mechanism, and millions of active and passive supporters. Islamic radicalism is a complex collection of non-nation actors (Al Qaeda and Hezbollah, for instance) and nation states such as Iran; they span the globe, are well funded, and are driven by leaders with deeply held beliefs who want to change the world using a very literal translation of the Koran. Some observers, ranging from former President Bush to newspaper columnists to thousands of Americans who are Muslim would say these radical Islamic leaders are clearly distorting Islam's message to their own ends.

Islamic radicalism is not defined in the Webster's dictionary, and is a many splendored term. In the context of today's fight against democracy in America, in other western governments, or against moderate Muslim nations, Islamic radicalism is an ideology practiced by individuals, groups, or nations that believe in authoritarian power, institutionalization of Sharia Law, oppression of women, and the elimination of any religion other than Islam. It is an ideology that promotes the reestablishment of the Islamic Caliphate

as it existed in the seventh century. It is a movement with roots on every continent, and a determination to win against its western, democratic, and Judeo-Christian counterparts.

One commonly accepted perception is that Islamic radicalism is a movement predominantly of the illiterate, poor, and disillusioned. Although this segment of Islam certainly gets recruited, on the whole Islamic radicalism embraces modernity, technology, the information-age, and is clearly represented by middle class, well educated people. Most infamous is the late-Mohammed Atta, cell-leader for the 9-11 attacks. Atta was from a middle-class Egyptian family, and was pursuing an engineering degree in Hamburg, Germany at the time of the world trade center attacks. Today, Islamic radicalism is busy recruiting members, raising money, planning attacks against targets in America and her allies, fighting United States and Allied forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, growing their population base in America and other western nations, and working to build greater acceptance of Islam while fighting so-called anti-Muslim initiatives in America under the veil of civil rights. They use the media masterfully to build popular support for their cause, and to attack the United States Government's efforts to provide security for her people both at home and abroad. According to author Stephen Lambert, these Islamic purists "passionately follow the example of their beloved Prophet Mohammed,"¹ as demonstrated by numerous Islamic radical leaders.

Islamic Radical Leaders and Their Ideology

Islamic radicalism incorporates a decentralized network, franchised around the world, with central leadership emanating from Al Qaeda Central in Pakistan.² Since 9-11 Al Qaeda

¹ Stephen Lambert, *Y: The Sources of Islamic Revolutionary Conduct*, (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic Intelligence Research, 2005), 157.

² Bruce Hoffman, "Outlook: Al-Qaeda's Grand New Strategy," Washington Post Online, 11 January 2010. www.washingtonpost.com (accessed 19 January 2010).

has adapted; while its leaders have been forced into hiding, they have continued to operate leveraging technology, the information domain, and the global transportation system. Whether or not Al Qaeda Central includes Osama Bin Laden is irrelevant; dead or alive, his iconic legacy endures. He is an inspiration to thousands, if not millions, of Muslim extremists for his ideological example, his vision for Islam's ascendancy, and his successful attacks against America. In the United States, 117,500 of an approximately 2.35 million Muslims, or 5%, "like what Bin Laden and his colleagues are doing and have a favorable view of their terrorist network."³ His legacy bears reflection.

In 1998, 10 years after establishing Al Qaeda in Afghanistan⁴ he returned to Afghanistan to train hard core jihadists, and chart a strategy to attack both Muslim governments who were acting "un-Islamic" and the United States.⁵ Al Qaeda had, by that time, declared war against America and had conducted significant attacks against her: Khobar Towers, 1996 and United States' Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, 1998. While previous Islamic radical leaders had been committed to the overthrow of "apostate" Middle East governments and to establishing a Palestinian state, he decided that it was of first importance to defeat America and to cut off her support to these same moderate Muslim governments. He explained in a 1998 ABC television interview that all Americans are targets, whether military or civilian, and that Americans are the "worst thieves and the worst

³ Joel Rosenberg, *Inside the Revolution: How the Followers of Jihad, Jefferson, and Jesus are Battling to Dominate the Middle East and Transform the World* (Carol Stream, IL: Tyndale House Publishers, 2009), 144.

⁴ Lawrence Wright, *The Looming Tower: Al Qaeda and the Road to 9/11* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006), 133.

⁵ Jane Corbin, *Al Qaeda: In Search of the Terror Network that Threatens the World*, (New York: Thunder's Mouth Press, 2002), 23.

terrorists.”⁶ His leadership and Al Qaeda’s ascendancy are eerily impressive, and as early as 2002, Al Qaeda drew on six to seven million radical Muslims world-wide, 120,000 of which were willing to take up arms⁷ and Al Qaeda-related cells existed in 60-70 nations across the globe by 2004-2005.⁸ As horrible as the 1998 embassy attacks in Africa, the 2000 USS Cole attack in Yemen, and those of 9-11 clearly are, arguably Al Qaeda’s most disconcerting accomplishment is that it has inspired thousands of Islamic radicals to join its cause against the United States, the West, and moderate Muslim governments.⁹ To be this successful, Bin Laden knew he needed help.

When Osama Bin Laden developed Al Qaeda’s vision to target the West, he did it in consultation with Egyptian Ayman Al-Zawahiri, whom he had met in the mountains of western Pakistan in the 1980s during the Soviet-Afghan War. Zawahiri, Al Qaeda’s number two man, is, according to some, the true thinker behind September 11.¹⁰ He was a member of the group that assassinated Egyptian President Anwar Sadat for signing a peace treaty with Israel in 1978. In the 1960s, he was imprisoned in Egypt with Sayyid Qutb, one of the original Islamic radical thinkers, and a man after whom he patterned his life; Qutb was executed in 1966 for actions against the Egyptian government.¹¹ As the leader of Jihad Group Egypt (also known as Egyptian Islamic Jihad), Zawahiri was a signatory to the 1998

⁶ 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 22 Jul 2004. Cited from http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/911Report_Ch2.htm (accessed 16 Nov 09)

⁷ Rohan Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 95.

⁸ Michael Chandler and Rohan Gunaratna, *Countering Terrorism: Can We Meet the Threat of Global Violence?* (London: Reaktion Books Ltd, 2007), 39.

⁹ Ibid., 20.

¹⁰ Gilles Kepel and Jean-Pierre Milelli, editors, *Al Qaeda In Its Own Words*, (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2008), 148.

¹¹ Ibid., 150-153.

Worldwide Islamic Front's declaration of war against the United States,¹² the same year that he formally merged Egyptian Islamic Jihad with Bin Laden's Al Qaeda.¹³

Bin Laden and Zawahiri's early and essential leadership aside, Al Qaeda has brilliantly adapted to threats against its existence, decentralized its leadership structure, and laid the seed for Islamic radical ideology resulting in multiple global affiliates. Al Qaeda is well financed, organized, remains dedicated to killing Americans, to the removal of United States forces from the Middle East, and to the return of the Muslim Caliphate, and it is not alone in its hatred for America and for the West.

Iran's Islamic radical leaders, President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad and Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, are determined to defeat the United States. Ahmedinejad, elected in 2005, has spewed anti-American and anti-Israeli rhetoric from the onset of his presidency. Some observers think he sincerely believes that the end of the world is two or three years away and in order to hasten the coming of the Mahdi, or the 12th Imam, he needs to annihilate two countries: Israel and the United States.¹⁴ Some maintain that Ahmedinejad thinks he is the 12th Imam which is an incredible claim to be sure, while others observe that he merely manipulates public opinion to support the Iranian regime's goals. Khamenei's rhetoric has also been disturbingly similar, and in 2005, he stated that the end of the United States will begin in Iraq, and that "One day the US, too, will be history."¹⁵ He claims that it

¹² Jim Lacey, editor, *The Canons of Jihad: Terrorists' Strategy for Defeating America*, (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2008), 3.

¹³ Devin R. Springer, James L. Regens, and David N. Edger, *Islamic Radicalism and Global Jihad* (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2009), 272.

¹⁴ Joel Rosenberg, *Inside the Revolution: How the Followers of Jihad, Jefferson, and Jesus are Battling to Dominate the Middle East and Transform the World* (Carol Stream, IL: Tyndale House Publishers, 2009), 168.

¹⁵ Steve Stalinsky, "The Iranian Threat: Ayatollah Ali Khamenei," *New York Sun*, 9 February 2005.

is the mission of Iran to erase Israel off the map.¹⁶ However, relations among Iran's top leaders are not as close as they would lead their followers to believe, and internal plays for power continue to destabilize Iran. Coupled with repression of freedoms in all forms, the country's continued pursuit of nuclear weapons is evidence that Iran is, as author and resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) Michael Ledeen cites, a "Time Bomb."¹⁷

Understanding these leaders is important to comprehending the depth of their fierce hatred for America. It is equally important to realize that the success of Islamic radicalism does not rely on centralized leadership, but this is not to say that it is leaderless. To describe the organizational network of Al Qaeda, author John Robb borrowed from management consultant Valdis Krebs' analysis of Al Qaeda following the 9-11 attacks and observed, "a leadership structure existed despite a lack of formal hierarchy." Robb predicts that terror networks will continue to evolve and operate in this way, and that observers should expect them "to be run by relative unknowns."¹⁸ Leaders of Al Qaeda, Iran, and others like them comprise a group of Muslim radicals who are fiercely dedicated to the defeat of the United States, Israel, and moderate Muslim regimes.

Radical Islamic Groups

Arguably, Al Qaeda and Iran are the two most recognizable proliferators of Islamic radicalism today, and the appeal of their rhetoric among Muslims is evident by the creation of numerous like-minded actors around the globe. In Gaza, Hamas, established in 1987 by the Muslim Brotherhood, exists to destroy Israel, and demonstrates its determination by

¹⁶ Kasra Naji, *Ahmadinejad: The Secret History of Iran's Radical Leader*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008), 144.

¹⁷ Michael Ledeen, *The Iranian Time Bomb* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2007), 28.

¹⁸ John Robb, *Brave New War* (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 2007), 138-139.

executing attacks against the Israeli occupation in West Bank and Gaza.¹⁹ From Lebanon, Hezbollah is dedicated to targeting the nation of Israel. It is funded and receives strategic direction from Iran, and operates almost solely from Lebanon. It has built its reputation for kidnapping westerners and leading the military campaign there against Israel in the 1990s.²⁰

In southeast Asia, the Philippine-based Abu Sayyaf broke from the Moro National Liberation Front in the early 1990s, and is determined to create a separate Islamic state for the Philippines' Muslim minority, and regularly conducts bombings, assassinations, kidnappings, and extortion in hopes of attaining their goal.²¹ In Indonesia, Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) operates in Southeast Asia with the goal of creating a regional Islamic state out of Indonesia, Malaysia, and the southern Philippines. Their most notable attack was the 2002 Bali nightclub bombing which killed 202 people.²²

In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood was established in 1928 to “revive Islam and counter the debilitating effects of British colonial domination,”²³ and remains committed today to targeting not only the moderate Muslim government in Egypt, but moderate Muslim governments across the broader Middle East. Their reach has extended west to both Great Britain and to the United States, and they have been cited as having goals to “eliminate and destroy western civilization from within” and to replace the Constitution with Sharia Law.²⁴

¹⁹ “Who are Hamas?” BBC News, 4 January 2009. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/1654510.stm> (accessed 15 February 2010).

²⁰ Michael Ledeen, *The War Against the Terror Masters: Why It Happened. Where We Are Now. How We'll Win* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2002), 25-27.

²¹ “Abu Sayyaf (Philippines, Islamic Separatists),” Council on Foreign Relations, 27 May 2009. <http://www.cfr.org/publication/9235/> (accessed 15 February 2010).

²² “Jemaah Islamiyah,” <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/ji.htm> (accessed 15 February 2010).

²³ Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, *The Age of Sacred Terror* (New York: Random House, 2002), 57.

²⁴ Jason Trahan, “Muslim Brotherhood's papers detail plan to seize U.S.,” Dallas Morning News, 17 September 2007.

In America, the largest organization which exists to protect civil liberties of Americans who are Muslim, the Council for American Islamic Relations (CAIR), reportedly exists to “enhance understanding of Islam, encourage dialogue, protect civil liberties, empower American Muslims, and build coalitions that promote justice and mutual understanding,”²⁵ but in 2009 the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) severed ties with the organization after discovering ties to both Hamas and to the Muslim Brotherhood. The Bureau had previously enlisted CAIR’s help dating back as early as 9-11.²⁶

In Somalia, Al-Shabaab, an Islamist militant organization based in the south, has ideological links to Al Qaeda dating back to 2007. It opposes the Somali transitional government, and controls much of southern Somalia excluding Mogadishu, though it has lost its impetus since Ethiopian forces, its original foe, left Somalia.²⁷ In Afghanistan, the Taliban’s moral and physical support of the 9-11 attacks is well documented, and the United States’ failure to coerce the Taliban to hand Bin Laden over throughout the 1990s and early 2000 is tragic, in retrospect.²⁸ They remain wholly committed to destabilizing the United States-backed Afghani government.

The Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in northwest Pakistan have long been home to jihadist groups determined to train, rehearse, practice, and export radical Islamic violence; these groups include the Afghani and Pakistani Taliban, Al Qaeda, the

<http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dws/news/localnews/stories/091707dnmetbrotherhood.35ce2b6.html> (accessed 16 February 2010).

²⁵ “The Council on American-Islamic Relations,” The Investigative Project on Terrorism. <http://www.investigativeproject.org/profile/172> (accessed 16 February 2010).

²⁶ Joel Himelfarb, “FBI Severs CAIR Ties – Group’s Credibility Takes a Hit from Holy Land Terror Trial,” Accuracy in Media, 9 February 2009. <http://www.aim.org/guest-column/fbi-severs-cair-ties-groups-credibility-takes-a-hit-from-holy-land-terror-t/> (accessed 16 February 2010).

²⁷ Stephanie Hanson, “Al-Shabaab,” Council on Foreign Relations, 27 February 2009. <http://www.cfr.org/publication/18650/> (accessed 25 January 2010).

²⁸ Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, *The Age of Sacred Terror* (New York: Random House, 2002), 289-290.

Chechens, and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan according to Pakistani journalist, Ahmed Rashid.²⁹ The United States leans heavily on Pakistan to counter these groups, but Pakistan remains much more focused on maintaining a strong military presence on their northern border where the Kashmir dispute with India continues to dominate their foreign policy agenda. In addition to the collection of groups just surveyed, two nations in particular merit consideration for their unique contributions to Islamic radicalism's advance against the United States and the West.

Two Countries of Interest

Since the February 1979 Iranian Revolution where the United States-backed Shah was deposed and fled the country, Iran has been a vocal and determined enemy of the West. Iran's new leadership, headed by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khomeini, proudly introduced Iran to the world as the newly renamed Islamic Republic. Post-revolution violence resulted in an angry mob storming the United States Embassy, seizing over 60 Americans hostage, and creating a 444 day crisis which absorbed the final 14 months of Jimmy Carter's Presidency. Iranian resentment dates to the 1950s according to author and former New York Times correspondent, Stephen Kinzer, who maintains that the roots of Middle East terror date to the 1953 United States-backed coup to overthrow Mossadegh, the elected Iranian President.³⁰ Since taking office, in an effort to stem the increasingly caustic rhetoric, newly elected United States President Obama adopted a markedly different stance from the Bush Administration. Conciliatory comments to stimulate an open dialogue with President

²⁹ Carin Zissis and Jayshree Bajoria, "Pakistan's Tribal Areas," Council on Foreign Relations, 26 October 2007, http://www.cfr.org/publication/11973/tribal_areas_of_pakistan.html?breadcrumb=%2Fissue%2F135%2Fterrorism (accessed 29 November 2009).

³⁰ Stephen Kinzer, *All the Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror* (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 2008), ix-x.

Ahmedinejad in hopes of getting Iran to abandon its nuclear ambitions have proved futile to date. Iranian leaders, President Ahmedinejad and Supreme Leader Khatameni, continue to rebuff United States attempts at reconciliation, maintaining that America is the great Satan and Israel the little Satan. They continue to develop Iran's nuclear weapons program despite condemnation by both the United Nations and the world community. Nuclear ambitions aside, the gravest Iranian threat is their continued exportation of Islamic radicalism by "proxy" as evidenced by Hezbollah's actions in Palestine and Israel, and by those of the Houthi rebels in Yemen.³¹ In Yemen, in particular, Iran has provided considerable support to their like-minded Shia brethren, the Houthi, in targeting the Yemeni regime, which is Sunni. This unrest on Saudi Arabia's border has compelled the Saudis (Sunnis) to target these Houthi rebels. In the larger context, Saudi Arabia's role in advancing Islamic radicalism will be considered next.

Saudi Arabian funding has spread Wahhabi doctrine (an 18th century reform movement to focus Muslims on belief in one god and to return to the literal sense of the Koran³²) in a vast number of mosques and schools in America; that the Saudi Government deliberately funded these mosques is not substantiated. According to author and American Enterprise Institute scholar Michael Ledeen, most of the 1200 mosques in America were built in the 1990s, are funded by Saudi money, serve as distribution points for anti-American literature, and are vital links in the logistical and communications architecture to overseas

³¹ "31 December 2009 - Global Arab Network - Iran and Al-Qaeda Source of Growing Terror in Yemen," The International Institute for Strategic Studies. <http://www.iiss.org/whats-new/iiss-in-the-press/december-2009/iran-and-al-qaeda-source-of-growing-terror-in-yemen/> (accessed 18 February 2010).

³² "Wahhabi," GlobalSecurity.org. <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/gulf/wahhabi.htm> (accessed 17 February 2010).

Islamic terror organizations.³³ Why is this so? What is the Saudi Government doing to identify and stop these groups' support of the spread of anti-American ideology? Additionally, why, despite the deployment of 550,000 coalition troops during Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm in 1990-91 to defend Saudi Arabia, did the Saudi Government give in to intense domestic pressure, and ask the United States to base its forces elsewhere, save for hundreds of United States troops that train their National Guard? Regardless, the United States remains allied with Saudi Arabia diplomatically and economically due to its heavy dependence on foreign oil; the United States imports 20% of its crude oil from there.³⁴ To Saudi Arabia's credit, they are taking marked steps to eliminate Islamic radical groups in their own country like the Houthi rebels both on their border with Yemen, and inside Yemen.³⁵ Yet, questions persist about their true intentions regarding the future of United States-Saudi relations, and their resolve in halting Islamic radicalism both regionally and globally.

Islamic Radical Goals

Islamic radicalism's goals are extraordinary. Though each group or nation involved has different motivations, the basic tenets can be summarized as follows: elimination of United States' (and other western government) presence and influence from the Middle East, and establishment of a Muslim Caliphate, an Islamic theocracy stretching from Central Asia

³³ Michael Ledeen, *The War Against The Terror Masters: Why It Happened. Where We Are Now. How We'll Win* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2002), 75-77.

³⁴ Sharon Otterman, "Saudi Arabia; Withdrawl of US Forces," Council on Foreign Relations, 2 May 2003. http://www.cfr.org/publication/7739/saudi_arabia.html (accessed 26 January 2010).

³⁵ Joost R. Hiltermann, "Disorder on the Border: Saudi Arabia's War Inside Yemen," Foreign Affairs, 16 December 2009. <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65730/joost-r-hiltermann/disorder-on-the-border> (accessed 18 February 2010).

to Spain and into Northern Africa³⁶, which represents the extent of Islam at its seventh century peak. Dr. Eugene Rogan, Director of Oxford's Middle East Center, has stated that Muslim radicals are determined to fight "globalization and their goal is to undo the Westphalian system and establish an Islamic Caliphate."³⁷ Author and United States Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Stephen Lambert writes:

"It is a religious war, initiated by the historical, religious imperatives of Islam. The conflict is a war between the ideas of Western democracy and those of revolutionary Islam. The enemy is a revolutionary Islamic vanguard, and it obtains its support from the resentment felt among followers of transnational Islam. The enemy is driven and sustained by an ideology rooted in the historical doctrines of Islam, is certain of Allah's divinely pre-ordained victory, and is imbued with an ideology that begins and ends with the Koran and the Prophet Mohammad. In other words, this is a religious war."³⁸

The United States' secular democratic paradigm will never be resolved within the Islamic radical vision. As Lambert states, the divided kingdom, as paralleled in the separation of church and state, is in utter conflict with Islam,³⁹ and Muslim revolutionaries are merely imitating their Prophet when they struggle against unbelievers, decapitate infidels, and call upon every believer to personally and individually engage in jihad. How they plan to win is sobering.

Radical Islamic Strategy

Renowned Middle East expert Bernard Lewis once wrote that the attacks of September 11 were merely the "opening salvo of a large scale campaign to force Americans and their allies out of Arabia and the rest of the Muslim world, to overthrow the corrupt

³⁶ United States Joint Forces Command, *The Joint Operating Environment* (Suffolk, VA: Center for Joint Futures (J59), 2008), 34; available at <https://us.jfcom.mil/sites/J5/j59/default.aspx>.

³⁷ Stephen Lambert, *Y: The Sources of Islamic Revolutionary Conduct* (Washington: Center for Strategic Intelligence Research, 2005), 157-158.

³⁸ Ibid., 159.

³⁹ Ibid., 157, 159.

tyrants America supports, and to prepare the ground for the final world struggle.”⁴⁰ To do so, Muslim radicals will continue to fight United States forces and its allies in Iraq and Afghanistan, and to target these forces based anywhere in the region. The Taliban is fiercely opposed to the United States-backed government in Kabul and efforts to establish a democratic government and the required security forces and government institutions to secure credible peace. As soon as the United States withdraws, they plan to reestablish a pre-9-11 Taliban regime. Iran and certain elements in Pakistan are also strongly opposed to the United States presence in Afghanistan, and continue to back Al Qaeda and the Taliban with materiel support. Iran funds business development, especially in Afghanistan’s western city, Herat, where they are seeking not only economic, but political influence as well.⁴¹ Islamic radical groups seek to mimic earlier attacks in the region, like the 1983 Marine barracks in Beirut (241 dead), the 1996 Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia (19 dead), and the 2000 USS Cole in Aden, Yemen (17 dead), relentlessly targeting United States personnel, facilities, embassies, ships, and business ventures. They believe that if they kill enough people they can reduce United States public support for the war, and force America to withdraw from Afghanistan just like they forced the Soviet Union to leave in 1989. Their success over the Soviets, a vulnerable superpower, provides significant motivation for them to eventually defeat the United States. Even more so, they have Israel in their “crosshairs.”

Since its inception in 1948, the modern Jewish state has been a target of its neighbors, and despite continuous efforts to bring Middle East peace, negotiating with Muslim radicals

⁴⁰ Bernard Lewis, *From Babel to Dragomans: Interpreting the Middle East* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 376.

⁴¹ Maseh Zarif and Ahmad Majidyar, “Iranian Influence in Afghanistan: Recent Developments” Iran News Digest, 25 August 2009. <http://wwwirannewsdigestcom/2009/08/25iranian-influence-in-afghanistan-recent-developments/> (accessed 7 December 2009).

will not succeed; Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran will continue to pursue the destruction of Israel. As Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon have noted, Islamic radical terrorists “do not want a place at the negotiating table; they want to shatter the table.”⁴² On the other hand, Israel receives enormous support from the West, namely Great Britain and the United States; for instance, the former made the 1917 Balfour Declaration to promote the inception of modern Israel, and the latter provides a huge amount of aid annually (\$2.4B in 2008 alone⁴³).

Some historical perspective is helpful to understand this hatred, because this divide is as old as the biblical character Abraham. According to biblical tradition, Abraham had a son, Ishmael, considered to be the father of the Arab race, by a mistress Hagar, because his wife Sarai was barren. The angel of the Lord said to Hagar when she was pregnant with Ishmael, “He will be a wild donkey of a man; his hand will be against everyone and everyone’s hand against him, and he will live in hostility toward all his brothers.”⁴⁴

Later, Abraham had a son, Isaac, by Sarai, the father of the nation of Israel. The hatred between the descendants of these brothers runs deep, and in a larger sense, pits Arabs against Jews, and in a religious sense, Muslims against Jews and Christians. The magnitude of this centuries-old family ‘feud’ cannot be discounted. Meanwhile, the Arab-Israel peace process remains mired in suspicion as both sides’ resistance to giving concession hardens year after year. Israel seeks to preserve its existence, and Islamic radicalism wants Israel gone.

Islamic radicalism is also taking advantage of America’s open society by targeting her right here at home. They are establishing communities in the United States, reproducing

⁴² Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, *The Age of Sacred Terror* (New York: Random House, 2002), 366.

⁴³ Shirl Arthur, “A Conservative Estimate of Total Direct Aid to Israel: Almost \$114 Billion” Washington Report on Middle Eastern Affairs, November 2008, 10-11. <http://wrmea.org/component/content/article/245-2008-november/3845-congress-watch-a-conservative-estimate-of-total-direct-us-aid-to-israel-almost-114-billion.html> (accessed 7 December 2009).

⁴⁴ Genesis 16:12, New International Version.

in large numbers, getting educated, finding positions in business and government, enmeshing themselves in American society, rallying support for their cause, and hoping to, ultimately, sideline secular democracy. According to 2007 Pew Research there are 2.35 million Muslims living in America; they are largely assimilated, happy, and moderate in their Islamic beliefs. Unfortunately, over 117,000, or 5% of them, hold favorable views of Bin Laden, Al Qaeda, and its terror network. Further, based on those who would not answer the survey, an additional 600,000 Americans who are Muslim may or may not hold these views. Further, over 23,000 Muslims in the United States believe suicide bombings against civilians are often justified, over 164,000 of them believe suicide bombings against civilians are sometimes justified, and an additional 211,000 of them refused to answer the question.⁴⁵

The birth rates for Muslim families in America are comparably higher than for their fellow Americans, and this bodes well for Islamic radicalism. The United States birth rate for 2008 was 13.9 per 1,000 persons,⁴⁶ a considerable drop from 16.7 per 1,000 in 1990.⁴⁷ *America Alone* author Mark Steyn laments that western societies are committing suicide by not reproducing enough; their populations are aging, and there are simply not enough people being born to sustain societal growth. Meanwhile, Muslims are generally reproducing much faster (eight times faster than the United States average, as described in the film, *The Third Jihad*⁴⁸); the same is happening overseas where they will be the predominant demographic in Europe within a generation. Clearly, not all these Muslims grow up and join jihad, but as

⁴⁵ Joel Rosenberg, *Inside the Revolution: How the Followers of Jihad, Jefferson, and Jesus are Battling to Dominate the Middle East, and Transform the World* (Carol Stream, IL: Tyndale House, 2009), 144-145.

⁴⁶ Sam Roberts, “Birth Rate Is Said to Fall as a Result of Recession,” New York Times, 6 Aug 2009. <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/07/us/07births.html> (accessed 9 Dec 2009).

⁴⁷ Robert Longley, “U.S. Birth Rate Hits All-Time Low,” About.com. <http://usgovinfo.about.com/cs/censusstatistic/a/aabirthrate.htm> (accessed 9 December 2009).

⁴⁸ *The Third Jihad: Radical Islam’s Vision for America*, PublicScope Films, 2008.

Londonistan author Melanie Phillips suggests, in the United Kingdom a growing Islamic population led to multiculturalism and appeasement, and resulted in a robust radical Islamic network that facilitated the July 2005 bombings in London. The United States is not immune. P. David Gaubatz and Paul Sperry write in *Muslim Mafia* that similar efforts are underway in America. Council on American-Islamic Relations' (CAIR) leaders hope to gain influence in United States Government, business, and media to stifle dissent against Islamic ideology, and gain allies among the American politic; CAIR was started by the Muslim Brotherhood. Muslim Brotherhood's goals for America, described in "The Project," will take decades of work, and to realize their goal of Sharia Law in America, they are pressing their agenda in United States public and private schools, through charitable organizations, and in American prisons. Based on increased leverage in curriculum development, money raised through so-called charitable organizations, and a growing number of Muslim converts in America's prisons, their strategy seems to be working.⁴⁹ Is America indifferent, or is all this normal in open society where the right to free speech, and the right to assemble are guaranteed?

The fact that the Defense Department's review of the November 2009 Hasan massacre at Fort Hood, Texas (13 dead) did not address why Major (MAJ) Hasan did what he did was explained away by Panel Head and former Army Secretary Togo West by saying that he was directed not to investigate MAJ Hasan's intentions, because of the ongoing criminal trial. This seems fair enough, but the facts depict a man who was chronically late for work, saw few patients, disappeared when he was on call, and confronted those around him with his Islamic views.⁵⁰ MAJ Hasan and a radical Yemeni cleric traded 10-20 electronic

⁴⁹ Brigitte Gabriel, *They Must Be Stopped*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2008), 73-115.

⁵⁰ "Leaders of Fort Hood Inquiry Avoid Hasan Questions," CBS News, 20 January 2010. <http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/01/20/ap/cabstatepent/main6120213.shtml> (accessed 30 January 2010).

messages (email) over the course of a year leading up to the massacre at Fort Hood, but since the emails' content was consistent with his research, it was not actionable, according to the FBI. The cleric in question, Anwar al-Awlaki, responded to the tragedy by stating on his website that this was a heroic act and that others should do the same.⁵¹

Islamic radical leaders are busy around the globe recruiting new members, indoctrinating leaders, raising funds, and planning future operations. They have a long view, 100 years (described in a documentary film titled *The Third Jihad*⁵²), and to defeat America, it is worth the effort. They will continue to lull Americans and United States national security leaders into complacency and apathy. It worked once; it took over five years from the time Osama Bin Laden declared war on America, but he executed the 9-11 attacks and killed more people than the Japanese did at Pearl Harbor. For all the intelligence collected on Bin Laden and Al Qaeda, the 9-11 attacks were unimaginable to United States policy makers. Al Qaeda and other members of Islamic radicalism will continue to fight United States forces overseas, and to target facilities and personnel wherever possible. They will continue to attack Israel, other western governments, and moderate Muslim regimes. They will continue to immigrate to America, increase their population base, preach violent jihad from mosques and schools here in America, and seek positions in business, government, academia, and the media to increase acceptance of Islamic ideology. They believe that they will eventually defeat American secular democracy. If United States national leaders fail to realize the severity of

⁵¹ Margaret Warner, "Connections Between Radical Cleric, Hasan Closely Examined," PBS News Hour, 12 November 2009. http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/religion/july-dec09/imam_11-12.html (accessed 30 January 2010).

⁵² *The Third Jihad: Radical Islam's Vision for America*, PublicScope Films, 2008.

this threat, the next 9-11 is inevitable. As Bernard Lewis has observed, America needs to “wake up.”⁵³

⁵³ The Third Jihad, 2008. http://www.thethirdjihad.com/about_new.php (accessed 10 December 2009).

CHAPTER TWO: UNITED STATES STRATEGY TO COUNTER ISLAMIC RADICALISM

Aftermath of 9-11

Following the attacks of 9-11, then-President Bush identified our enemies as Al Qaeda and any terror group of global reach, labeled North Korea, Iran, and Iraq the axis of evil, and called out the international community to either be with us or against us. Within a month, and after the Taliban government had refused to cooperate with the United States to hand over Osama Bin Laden, the United States went to war in Afghanistan, with broad international support, to destroy al Qaeda camps, to kill or capture Bin Laden and other Al Qaeda leadership, and to decapitate the Taliban government. By spring 2002, United States forces had succeeded in destroying most of Al Qaeda's camps and in unseating the Taliban, Bin Laden was on the run, and United States forces had eliminated significant numbers of key leaders. The United States then set about helping to establish a democratic government in arguably the world's most tribal-centric, impoverished, geographically-isolated, technologically primitive, corrupt, and illiterate nations.¹ It has been said that Afghanistan was wrecked by two men: Christopher Columbus and Genghis Khan. Columbus discovered a sea route to the West Indies, and eliminated the need for an overland route through Central Asia. Genghis Khan literally devastated the entire country, left few alive, and destroyed crops, property, and livestock.² Afghanistan is stuck in the past, which is not altogether bad, but it does makes projecting power and conducting military operations there extremely difficult and expensive.

¹ Central Intelligence Agency, *World Fact Book*, 30 November 2009.

<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html> (accessed 14 Dec 2009).

² Stephen Tanner, *Afghanistan: A Military History from Alexander the Great to the Fall of the Taliban* (New York: Da Capo Press, 2002), 2-3.

While still far from mission complete in Afghanistan, the United States then invaded Iraq in 2003 to remove Sadaam Hussein from power. The Bush Administration's case for regime change was that Hussein had attained weapons of mass destruction, had colluded with Al Qaeda, had killed 180,000 of his own people (the Kurds), and had violated United Nations sanctions for over 12 years; he needed to be removed from power to bring stability to the region. A United States-led coalition invaded Iraq in March 2003, and within weeks, had seized Baghdad, Hussein was on the run, the Iraqi Army had been defeated, and victory seemed all but sure, save for stability operations. Unfortunately, a violent insurgency erupted, fomented by Al Qaeda, and materially supported by Iran and Syria. Foreign fighters flooded to Iraq, and in 2007 then-President Bush deployed additional troops to counter the insurgency in concert with both Anbari and other tribes, local populaces, and the Iraqi security forces. United States combat forces are currently slated to withdraw by summer 2010, leaving training teams in place through 2011. President Obama is now deploying additional troops to Afghanistan to defeat the Taliban-led insurgency there, and plans to start withdrawing troops from that theater by summer 2011. But these are the front lines (the battlefields of Afghanistan and Iraq); what is the broader United States strategy in fighting the war against Islamic radicalism? Before that question is answered, a discussion of strategy's purpose is useful.

Strategy's Purpose

Borrowing from the Bartlett Model, strategy is the roadmap to accomplish stated objectives, or ends, utilizing available tools or means. National leaders must properly assess the security environment, understand the risk involved to win, and estimate the required cost

in any given national strategy problem.³ Using this model, the first question is what are the goals, objectives, or ends as identified by national leadership? Knowing the strategic environment and the stated objectives, a strategy must then be constructed that utilizes all instruments of national power⁴ (diplomatic, informational, military, and economic) in the pursuit of these objectives. The strategy must be adequately resourced by the national treasury and the nation's armed forces, and supported by the public; allies and international bodies must be rallied. Lastly, national power must be coordinated towards a singular focus or it will be squandered, as time, lives, money, and public support are expended with no discernible advancement toward stated objectives. Lacking coordination, deployments could be made, patrols conducted, bombs dropped, security assistance provided, diplomatic efforts made, foreign government capacity strengthened, sanctions placed against adversaries, and an information campaign executed to pursue stated war aims domestically and overseas, and it could be all for nothing. Lastly, heeding the spirit of the Weinberger Doctrine, a continual reassessment must be made to ensure that the nation's objectives are appropriate, the strategy is consistent, and the means are available to support the effort. Weinberger's fourth tenet reads,

“The relationship between the objectives sought and the size and composition of the forces committed should be constantly reassessed and adjusted as necessary.”⁵

³ Henry C. Bartlett, G. Paul Holman, Jr., and Timothy E. Somes, “The Art of Strategy and Force Planning,” The Security, Strategy, and Forces Faculty, Ed., *Strategy and Force Planning*, Fourth Edition (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2004), 18-21.

⁴ The instruments of national power are defined in Joint Publication 1-02, *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Term* (Washington, DC: Joint Doctrine Division, J7, Joint Staff, 19 August 2009), as “all of the means available to the government in its pursuit of national objectives. They are expressed as diplomatic, economic, informational and military.”

⁵ Michael I. Handel, *Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought* (Portland, OR: Frank Cass Publishers, 2003), 310-311.

What follows is a survey of what the United States strategy in this war has been, how each instrument of national power has been incorporated into that strategy, and how much has been spent to utilize that specific instrument of national power.

United States Strategy Since 9-11

The 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS) described a new enemy with global reach, and declared that the United States could no longer hide behind two oceans, and rely on deterrence and defense to thwart these terrorists. The 2006 NSS stated that the United States “must take the fight to the enemy,” that America needs the “concerted action of friends and allies,” and that she “would join with others to deny the terrorists” safe haven, financial support, and protection from certain nation-states. It goes on to describe the long-term solution to transnational terrorism to be the advance of human freedom and dignity through democracy and named Jordan, Morocco, and Indonesia as successful showcases of this phenomenon. The President then laid out four critical steps to fighting transnational terrorism: One, prevent attacks by killing or capturing hard core terrorists, cut off the networks and supporting institutions on which they depend, and deter, disrupt, and disable these networks. Two, deny weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to rogue states or terrorist allies who would use them. Three, deny terrorist groups the support and sanctuary of rogue states, specifically Syria and Iran. And fourth, deny the terrorists control of any nation that they would use as a base and launching pad for terror, especially Afghanistan and Iraq, the front lines in the war on terror. Three priorities were described to win on the front lines. One, work with the Iraqis, politically, to isolate hardened enemies, engage those outside the political process, and build pluralistic national institutions. Two, work with Iraqi security forces to clear enemy areas of control, hold areas freed from enemy control, and build

security forces to deliver services, advance rule of law, and nurture civil society. Three, work with the Iraqi Government to restore Iraq's neglected infrastructure, reform their economy, and build capacity of their institutions.⁶ Though President Obama has not yet codified his NSS, he has spoken about it.

In March 2009, when the President announced a “new strategy” for the war in Afghanistan, he stated that Al Qaeda is planning attacks against the United States homeland from their safe haven in Pakistan, and that if the Afghan Government falls to the Taliban or allows Al Qaeda to go unchallenged, Afghanistan will again be a base for terrorists who “want to kill as many of our people as they can.” He rationalized that the United States did not decide to go to war in Afghanistan, but that 3,000 people died on 9-11 going about their daily lives, and America had to fight back to bring justice to the perpetrators. He went on to explain that the United States must now seek lasting partnerships with Afghanistan and Pakistan, and that the road ahead would be long.⁷ Nine months later, and in response to General McChrystal’s request of August 2009, the President said on 1 December 2009 that he was deploying 30,000 troops to Afghanistan, because it is in the United States vital national interest to:

1. Seize the initiative against the Taliban-led insurgency
2. Build capacity for the Afghans
3. Allow for a responsible transition of our forces out of that country starting in summer 2011.⁸

⁶ The White House, *National Security Strategy* (March 2006), 8,11-13.

⁷ “President Obama’s Speech on Afghanistan and Pakistan,” US News and World Report, 27 March 2009. <http://www.usnews.com/articles/news/2009/03/27/president-obamas-speech-on-afghanistan-and-pakistan.html> (accessed 31 January 2010).

⁸ “Obama’s Address on the War in Afghanistan,” The New York Times, 1 December 2009. http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/02/world/asia/02prexy.text.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1 (accessed 31 January 2010).

In his State of the Union address on 27 January 2010, however, it is unfortunate that the President paid relatively little attention to the war against Islamic Radicalism. In a 75 minute speech, he spoke for nine minutes about national security. He pledged to fight terrorism and to deal harshly with Iran if they continued to develop nuclear weapons, and the only time he talked about the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq was when he talked about withdrawing the troops from Iraq. He made no challenges to foreign leaders. David Rothkopf, former Clinton Administration official and foreign policy expert, said that he cannot recall the last time a “State of the Union” paid less time or attention to foreign policy issues.⁹ In sum, the President has shown commitment to the war in Afghanistan, and to finishing the job in Iraq, but in the broader strategy of fighting the war against Islamic Radicalism, the Administration has yet to identify the desired strategic endstate and objectives.

The necessary debate about what the national objectives are in the war against Islamic Radicalism seems to be secondary to the President’s domestic agenda. A possible method to formalize his position would be for President Obama to adopt a national security policy document, similar to how President Truman presented National Security Council (NSC) - 68 as his Administration’s position in countering the Soviet Union; NSC-68 outlined the United States approach to the Soviets in a bi-polar Cold War, and this approach endured for four decades until the war with the Soviets ended.¹⁰ Such a document would be useful now, short of an NSS, which, after 14 months, has yet to be published. President Obama has clarified his

⁹ Helene Cooper, “In Speech, Little Time Spent on National Security,” The New York Times, 27 January 2010. <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/28/us/politics/28prexy.html> (accessed 31 January 2010).

¹⁰ “The War Against Muslim Extremism: Time For a New NSC-68?” United States Naval Institute, January 2010. <http://blog.usni.org/2010/01/07/the-war-against-muslim-extremism-time-for-a-new-nsc-68/> (accessed 27 February 2010).

policy for fighting in Afghanistan and for the withdrawal of forces from Iraq, but has done little to clarify any change from former President Bush policies in fighting terrorism domestically. Based on policy decisions from the Bush Administration and adjustments made by the Obama Administration, President Obama's National Security leadership must tailor an appropriate strategy and coordinate its execution across the United States Government, ensuring the effective utilization of all the instruments of national power. How national policy to counter Islamic Radicalism has shaped the strategies of the executive departments is the subject of the next section.

Departmental Strategies to Counter Transnational Terror

Department of State's (DOS) lead, the Office of Coordinator for Counterterrorism, leads the United States Government effort to defeat international terrorism in the following manner: build counterterrorism (CT) capacity in foreign governments, use public diplomacy to delegitimize terrorism, "freeze" the financial assets of designated terrorist organizations, deter and respond to terrorist incidents, deliver finance training, enhance border security, support embassies with CT assistance, integrate homeland security initiatives with foreign policy, utilize technological development, and develop the intellectual capacity for a decades-long struggle.¹¹ Department of State also negotiates with United States partners to levy sanctions when necessary. Emblematic of Treasury Department's efforts, is the 15 October 2009 designation of Bekkay Harrach as an Al-Qaeda member, currently believed to be located in the Pakistan/Afghanistan border region acting on behalf of Al-Qaeda. This designation "freezes" financial assets that Harrach has under United States jurisdiction, and

¹¹ Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Department of State, *Our Mission*.
<http://www.state.gov/s//ct/about/c16570.htm> (accessed 9 January 2010).

prohibits any transactions with him by United States persons.¹² Department of Justice's (DOJ) top priority since 9-11 is the prevention of terrorist attacks, and success in this effort is best achieved by developing partnerships with "peace loving allies" to prevent terrorists from attacking Americans, rather than just reacting and responding to them; sharing information with America's partners is a huge departure from past DOJ practices.¹³ The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) also has the lead for monitoring suspicious individuals here at home, and the Hasan case at Fort Hood, Texas is such a case, where, arguably, FBI efforts did not fare too well; this case is indicative of the natural tension that policy makers must resolve when balancing national security with civil liberties.

In the area of immigration control, a 25 November 2009 article in the London Telegraph highlights the challenge to allowing legitimate visitors into Great Britain, while detaining or refusing entry to those who would do us harm. The report alleged that Al Qaeda operatives routinely exploit loose visa and immigration rules to enter Britain, and 13,000 visitors from Pakistan alone may have entered that country since October 2008 without any checks on their supporting documentation due to undermanned Home Office staffs.¹⁴ Homeland Security's challenge is eerily similar as evidenced by the recent deportation of Mohamed Suliman Adam to Sudan by Immigration and Customs Enforcement officials for his self-professed terrorist ties to Al Qaeda.¹⁵ Building closer relationships with allies is key,

¹² "Treasury Designates Al-Qaeda Member," Press Room, Department of Treasury, 15 October 2009. <http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/tg319.htm> (accessed 8 January 2010).

¹³ Stewards of the American Dream: FY 2007-2012 Strategic Plan, US Department of Justice, 17, 21. <http://www.justice.gov/jmd/mps/strategic2007-2012/index.html> (accessed 9 January 2010).

¹⁴ Duncan Gardham, "Hidden Threat From Al Qaeda Sleeper Cells," Telegraph.co.uk, 27 November 2009. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/6672806/Hidden-threat-from-al-Qaeda-sleeper-cells.html> (accessed 31 January 2010).

¹⁵ "ICE Removes Al Qaeda-Linked Terrorist and Convicted Criminals Out of the U.S.," US Customs and Immigration Enforcement, 17 December 2009. <http://www.ice.gov/pi/nr/0912/091217washington.htm> (accessed 31 January 2010).

and in related news, the failure, for over a year, of the Obama Administration to name a Director, Transportation Security Administration, is not helping solve the problem, as many countries around the world look to America for leadership in handling airport security.¹⁶

Secretary Gates, in the 2008 National Defense Strategy (NDS), named Al Qaeda as a violent extremist movement that presents a complex and urgent challenge much like communism and fascism, and labels Iran and North Korea as threats to international order. Both regimes are pursuing nuclear technology, and Iran is clearly committed to sponsoring terrorism to disrupt young democracies in Iraq and in Afghanistan. He later stated that “winning the Long War against violent extremist movements will be the central objective of the US” and that we face an “extended series of campaigns to defeat violent extremist groups,” led by Al Qaeda and others. The NDS stated that maintaining a long-term commitment to reducing sources of support for these groups and countering their ideological message is critical, that this war is global, and that perhaps the most important military element of this war is not America’s campaign to kill or capture terrorists, but that of helping “prepare our partners to defend and govern themselves.”¹⁷ As the NDS states, “countering their ideological message is critical,” but it is not Defense’s job to chart the nation’s strategy to win the war of ideas; whose is it?

Information War Against Islamic Radicalism

In April 2006, then-President Bush established the Policy Coordination Committee (PCC) on Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communications to ensure: one, that all agencies work together to disseminate the President’s themes and messages, two, all public diplomacy

¹⁶ Keith Johnson, “White House Scrambles for TSA Head,” The Wall Street Journal, 28 March 2010. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304434404575149824210974044.html?mod=googlenews_wsj (accessed 28 March 2010).

¹⁷ Department of Defense, *National Defense Strategy* 2008, 2-3, 7-8.

and strategic communications resources, programs, and activities are effectively coordinated, and three, every agency gives public diplomacy and strategic communications the same level of priority that the President does. The PCC on Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication established three strategic objectives: one, America must offer a positive vision of hope and opportunity that is rooted in America's Freedom Agenda, two, with our partners, the United States Government seeks to isolate and marginalize violent extremists who threaten the freedom and peace sought by civilized people of every nation, culture and faith, and three, America must work to nurture common interests and values between Americans and people of different countries, cultures and faiths across the world. This is noble, but is America, which has in the past been so committed to industrial development, maximum (lethal, kinetic) firepower, and advanced technology, willing to modify its way of war to win in the current conflict?

Islam Radicalism has realized that its success is tied in large measure to identifying, developing, and refining asymmetric methods to defeat the American superpower. The United States Government must fight the strategic communications war by staying consistent with the American message of freedom, individual responsibility, and charity while countering the enemy's destructive vision of repression, power, and bondage. Continuing to engage neutral governments and peoples to join her is vital for America, as well as continuing to bolster friendships with her Allies. As Admiral Mullen wrote in August 2009, central to this fight is the absolute necessity for United States deployed forces to send a sincere and consistent message of American democratic freedom with both words and actions.¹⁸ The United States Government also needs to continue to encourage and leverage

¹⁸ Admiral Mike Mullen, "Strategic Communications: Getting Back to the Basics," Joint Chiefs of Staff, 28 August 2009. <http://www.jcs.mil/newsarticle.aspx?ID=142> (accessed 7 March 2010).

non-governmental organizations that will invest time, energy, and resources in the Muslim world. This will probably get more done to change hearts than any government program. The United States can do this, but it has to be committed, consistent, and patient in coordinating its information strategy across the interagency, because it is going to last decades, if not generations. As President Bush said numerous times after 9-11, this is going to be a long war and the American people need to understand that.

The American refusal to believe that it was at war with Islamic Radicalism evaporated on 9-11. These attacks killed close to 3,000 people, resulted in the loss of a trillion dollars in capital and \$100B in property damage, put millions out of work, delayed citizens due to increased security measures, restricted access to public facilities, and left lingering fear about future attacks.¹⁹ In reality, Al Qaeda attacked not only the American economy, her people, and her symbols of greatness, but her way of life which is rooted in the foundational American belief that all men are created equal. This grand war of ideas exploded into American living rooms as news networks fed a constant stream of deadly images.

In response, America fought back not just in Afghanistan and in Iraq, but in concert with numerous partners on every continent. State Department has since led the interagency effort to build capacity amongst allied governments to provide essential services, security, and good governance. The United States Government has, in some cases, leveraged increased trade and foreign aid to help bolster weak economies, while it has also withdrawn foreign aid or placed sanctions against adversaries to compel them to act differently and to be responsible members in the international community. At home, the United States

¹⁹ Victor Davis Hanson, *Ripples of Battle: How Wars of the Past Still Determine How We Fight, How We Live, and How We Think* (New York: Anchor Books, 2003), 11.

Government took steps to gain better control of her borders, to target and seize money linked to terrorist groups, and to improve training to identify and respond to suspicious behavior. Embedded in the United States' strategy has been an effort to communicate to foreign audiences and to the American people that America is not at war with Islam, but with those who 'distort' Islam to rationalize murderous and destructive attacks. United States national leaders would do well to learn from other historical examples in the "War of Ideas."

In 1787, a 28 year old lawmaker, William Wilberforce, from Hull, Yorkshire began a daring assault on the entrenched slavery trade in the British Empire. He took on the social elite, wealthy slave traders, and a resistant public to eliminate an extremely profitable, yet horribly inhumane business that was, arguably, the backbone of the British economy. Vicious assaults were levied upon him for being "anti-British" and a disloyal subject of the Crown. Wilberforce remained steadfast; inspired by evangelist George Whitfield and former slave trader John Newton. He intently studied the slave trade and its basic abhorrent core which is that men were being treated like goods, and he slowly won over members of Parliament. He was greatly assisted by both abolitionist Thomas Clarkson and the Clapham Sect, a group that successfully enhanced public awareness. Eventually, in 1807, after almost two decades, Parliament finally voted to abolish the slave trade in the British Empire; 26 years later, in 1833, they abolished slavery entirely in the British colonies. Both were radical steps which turned the British economy on its side, took close to 50 years to accomplish, but freed millions of African slaves within the British Empire, and it would not have been possible without the decision by William Wilberforce to engage in a massive war of ideas: freedom of all men versus great monetary profit on the backs of people in bondage. He risked his

political life and his reputation, endured enormous opposition, and lived, by three days, to see the end of slavery in all of Britain.²⁰

By comparison, the United States' current war is in its ninth year, and has endured an Administration change, four Congressional elections, and plenty of public scrutiny. Still, many Americans are oblivious to the ideas being fought over, and merely want to be safe. Unfortunately, there is much more at stake in this war; yet, many people are unaware of its consequences. President Obama's focus is on domestic challenges, but he has certainly addressed, though not yet published, a National Security Strategy (NSS). The next section addresses the NSS from 2001 to the present, costs incurred, and required coordination in protecting America.

Resource Cost and Effective Coordination

Military

President Obama, in his fiscal year 2010 (FY10) budget, requested \$130 billion (B) plus a \$30B FY09 supplemental for defense (along with DOD's baseline request of \$534B)²¹ and \$53.9B for international development (with \$52.2B programmed for State-Foreign Operations)²² for war-funding. From 2001-2009, an estimated \$888B and \$49.1B (\$937B total) has been spent on war funding by the Defense and State Departments respectively, or

²⁰ "William Wilberforce (1759 - 1833)," British Broadcasting Corporation. http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/historic_figures/wilberforce_william.shtml (accessed 3 March 2010), and "William Wilberforce (1759-1833)," Britannia. <http://www.britannia.com/bios/wilberforce.html> (accessed 3 March 2010).

²¹ Amy Belasco, "Troop Levels in the Afghan and Iraq Wars, FY2001-2012: Cost and Other Potential Issues (R40682)," Congressional Research Service, 2 July 2009, Table 2. <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/126835.pdf> (accessed 26 January 2010).

²² Susan Epstein, Kennon Nakamura, and Marian Lawson, "State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs: FY2010 Budget and Appropriations (R40693)," Congressional Research Service, 29 December 2009, Summary. <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/138724.pdf> (accessed 26 January 2010).

an average of close to \$99B and \$5.5B annually.²³ During this period, the Bush Administration designated Afghanistan and Iraq as the frontlines of the “War on Terror,” with Iraq as priority from 2003 through 2009; President Obama has since signaled his intent to reprioritize the effort in Afghanistan, so the resource tail is sure to follow. Appropriations for war funding comprise: military operations, base security, reconstruction, foreign aid, embassy costs, and veterans’ health care for the three operations initiated since 9-11 (Enduring Freedom, Noble Eagle, and Iraqi Freedom). Assessing all appropriations approved by Congress from 2001 to 2010, Iraq has received approximately 73% of the monies, Afghanistan 24%, and enhanced base security roughly 3%. About 94% of the funds have been for DOD, 6% for foreign aid programs and embassy operations, and less than 1% for veterans’ medical care.²⁴ Clearly, the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan have been heavily resourced, indicative of America’s tendency to use its military to solve complex foreign policy problems. With close to a \$1 trillion spent on defense since 9-11 and less than \$10B (or approximately 1%) spent on State and foreign operations, two questions must be answered: whether or not the United States is fiscally irresponsible in continuing to pay for these campaigns, and whether or not the United States has resourced non-military instruments of power sufficiently.

The fact that the Defense Department’s budget has dwarfed other Departmental budgets during this period is tied to the huge numbers of troops that have been deployed since 2001, and to the complexity of military operations relative to the cost of resourcing diplomatic and other non-military options. Since FY03 there have been an average of 29,200

²³ Amy Belasco, “The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11 (RL33110),” Congressional Research Service, 15 May 2009, Table 3.
<http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/125514.pdf> (accessed 26 January 2010).

²⁴ Ibid., Summary.

troops annually in Afghanistan, and an average of 126,600 troops annually in Iraq. Counting the additional 100,000 troops deployed to the Central Command region who provide theater-wide support for both wars, there are over 250,000 troops in the region supporting the war against Islamic radicalism. Once current surge forces arrive in Afghanistan, and the currently planned withdrawal of forces from Iraq is complete, there are projected to be an estimated 63,500 US troops in Afghanistan (highest since Operation Enduring Freedom commenced) and an estimated 88,300 US troops in Iraq (lowest since 2003).²⁵ Summarizing the fiscal impact is essential, but no tabulation of costs is complete without discussing casualties.

Steven Spielberg's landmark 1998 film "Saving Private Ryan" was a moving tribute to the thousands of heroic World War II veterans, living and dead, who fought to defeat fascist Germany and Imperial Japan; collectively dubbed by special correspondent for NBC news Tom Brokaw as the "Greatest Generation." Opening the first chapter of his book by the same name, he wrote:

The year of my birth, 1940, was the fulcrum of America in the twentieth century, when the nation was balanced precariously between the darkness of the Great Depression on one side and the storms of war in Europe and the Pacific on the other. It was a critical time in the shaping of this nation and the world, equal to the revolution of 1776 and the perils of the Civil War. Once again the American people understood the magnitude of the challenge, the importance of an unparalleled national commitment, and, most of all, the certainty that only one resolution was acceptable. The nation turned to its young to carry the heaviest burden, to fight in enemy territory and to keep the home front secure and productive. These young men and women were eager for the assignment. They understood what was required of them, and they willingly volunteered for their duty.²⁶

²⁵ Amy Belasco, "Troop Levels in the Afghan and Iraq Wars, FY2001-2012: Cost and Other Potential Issues (R40682)," Congressional Research Service, 2 July 2009, Summary and Table 1. <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/126835.pdf> (accessed 26 January 2010).

²⁶ Tom Brokaw, *The Greatest Generation* (New York: Random House, 1998), 3.

In the current war, America faces no less determined a foe, and her young generation has responded with remarkable courage, valor, and perseverance. To date America has lost 5,300 Americans killed in action (KIA)²⁷, and sustained an additional 36,000 wounded in action (WIA).²⁸ A heavy toll has been placed on military marriages and families with divorce rates rising from 2.6% in 2001 to 3.6% in 2009 across all services due to stress and the frequency and duration of deployments; no corollary statistics are available for the civilian populace.²⁹ Sexual assaults were also up, in 2009, 11% across the services.³⁰ This generation has clearly risen to the challenge, but with this war in its ninth year (WWII lasted less than four years), the force is fatigued, and this underscores for United States national security leadership the need to set clear political objectives before committing military forces. Ultimately, the political nature of conflict has preeminence in strategy making, which will be discussed in the following section about the diplomatic instrument of national power.

Diplomatic

The Bush Administration's National Security Strategy encompassed development, defense, and diplomacy in 2002 and in 2006. President Obama has, by all appearances, carried these efforts forward to include the transformational diplomacy initiative which repositioned diplomats to global trouble spots, created regional public diplomacy centers, established small posts outside foreign capitals, and trained new diplomats in new skills.

²⁷ "Faces of the Fallen," The Washington Post. <http://projects.washingtonpost.com/fallen/> (accessed 17 February 2010).

²⁸ "Honor the Fallen," Iraq and Afghanistan Veterans of America. <http://iava.org/> (accessed 17 February 2010).

²⁹ Pauline Jelinek, "Military Divorce Rates Climbing Amid Stress of War," The Philadelphia Inquirer, 29 November 2009.

http://www.philly.com/inquirer/world_us/20091129_Military_divorce_rates_climbing_amid_stress_of_war.htm (accessed 19 February 2010).

³⁰ "DoD: Reports of Sex Assault Up in 2009," WAVY.com, 16 March 2010.

<http://www.wavy.com/dpp/military/DOD-Releases-Annual-Sexual-Assault-Response-and-Prevention-Report-> (accessed 28 March 2010).

Much of this focus was born in the aftermath of 9-11 when the Bush Administration highlighted the war on terrorism as the top foreign aid priority and emphasized assistance to countries that cooperated with the United States to fight terrorism or faced significant terrorist threats at home. The Obama Administration's FY10 budget intends to follow suit, but goes a step further by enhancing the capacity of civilian diplomatic and development agencies.³¹

Funding for State-Foreign Operations has been appropriated at an average \$37.7B annually from 2001 to present; this supports the approximately 30,000 people who work in the State Department (DOS), 60% of whom work abroad. The people doing the "heavy lifting" in DOS, those of the Diplomatic and Consular Program, have an FY10 budget request of \$9B, \$1.8B more than FY09, which accounts for a personnel increase of 1,181 positions above attrition with about 750 of these new positions designated for the Foreign Service, reflecting the Obama Administration's intention to significantly expand United States diplomatic capacity. The President's budget also reflects continued commitment to the Civilian Stabilization Initiative (CSI), established in 2004 to improve the ability of United States civilian agencies to promote stability in post-conflict situations around the world. The FY10 CSI budget is \$323 million, a 331% increase over the FY09 budget.³² Part of this mandate was for the State Department's Coordinator of Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) to establish a Civilian Response Corps (CRC) of trained federal civilian and non-governmental employees with key expertise capable of rapidly deploying to post-conflict environments in trouble areas. As part of the "surge" in Afghanistan, the United States

³¹ Susan Epstein, Kennon Nakamura, and Marian Lawson, "State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs: FY2010 Budget and Appropriations," Congressional Research Service, 29 December 2009, Summary and 4-5. <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/138724.pdf> (accessed 26 January 2010).

³² Ibid., 8, 10.

Government hoped (as of December 2009) to have a total of 1,000 civilians on the ground there by early 2010 to help build Afghan capacity, as compared to only 300 that were present in January 2009.³³

Clearly, resourcing diplomatic initiatives is receiving increased attention as United States national leaders realize that winning the war against Islamic radicalism must be a combination of both the United States Government's counterterrorism efforts abroad and building international cooperation as the United States continues to do with Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. Anthony Cordesman, of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, has written that America needs to continue to use aid and diplomacy to help weak governments build capacity in providing good governance, security, and essential services to their people.³⁴ This is vital in addressing one of the roots of the problem, and will help improve the quality of life for many of these disillusioned people and, in the end, help curtail recruiting efforts by Islamic radical leadership. As Christopher Lamb and Martin Cinnamond, of the Institute for National Security Studies, recommend with regard to ongoing operations in Afghanistan right now,³⁵ continuing to connect America's civilian and military efforts on the ground in these countries is crucial to long term success. Stronger emphasis on diplomatic efforts, in concert with already robust military operations, will help eventually turn the tide in America's war effort. Even more crucial is a critical analysis of the

³³ Jay Solomon, "Training for the Civilian Surge," The Wall Street Journal, 18 December 2009. <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB126109820281496435.html> (accessed 4 February 2010).

³⁴ Anthony Cordesman, "The True Lessons of Yemen and Detroit: How the US Must Expand and Redefine International Cooperation in Fighting Terrorism," Center for Strategic and International Studies, 25 January 2010, 3.

³⁵ Christopher Lamb and Martin Cinnamond, "Unity of Effort: Key to Success in Afghanistan," Strategic Forum, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, No. 248, October 2009, 10.

Information Strategy and the commitment of sufficient resources needed to win the Strategic Communications war and eventually bring enduring change.

Information and Strategic Communications

In summarizing the cost of fighting the Information or Strategic Communications war, the following is provided: the public diplomacy budget request for FY09 provided \$400 million (M) to influence foreign opinion and win support for United States foreign policy goals. An additional \$522M was requested for educational and cultural exchanges to increase mutual understanding and engage leaders. Other associated budgetary support which supported the nation's war against violent extremists included: \$1.6B for Developmental Assistance to promote transformational diplomacy, \$3.3B for Economic Support to help rebuild, develop, and create stable environments, \$298M for Disaster Assistance and Humanitarian Relief, \$90M to strengthen military alliances and to build an international coalition to fight global terror, \$1.2B for Food Aid, \$40M for conflict-prone countries, \$699M for Broadcasting Board of Governors which provided foreign audiences with accurate news about the United States, \$2.2B for Millenium Challenge Corporation to support countries that govern justly and support economic freedom, and \$343M for the Peace Corps.³⁶ These sums reflect a \$9.7B commitment by the United States Government in FY09 to specifically shape the information environment which, next to \$9B for State in FY09, is comparable, but, next to \$163B for Defense in FY10, is paltry. America's commitment to winning the "War of Ideas" is debatable, for perhaps the highest price America has paid since 9-11 has been her lost prestige among foreign audiences for the manner in which the "War on Terror" is being waged and, especially, for pressing the United States' case in Iraq. The

³⁶ "Strategic Communication and US Public Diplomacy," Operational Art and Campaigning Primer AY09-10, Joint Advanced Warfighting School, Joint Forces Staff College, 25-29.

Qatari-based Al Jazeera news network constantly reports to the Middle Eastern world on the United States war of ideas, but, unfortunately, they contend that America's war is against Islam.³⁷

United States national leaders have worked hard to communicate that they are not at war with Islam, but against those who distort Islam's message to murder Americans. President Bush was pictured with Islamic leaders shortly after 9-11 to demonstrate this theme. America's national leaders from both Administrations since 9-11 have taken counsel from prominent Muslim Americans to explore ways that America can engage the Muslim world to improve the nation's image. However, United States national leaders have gone so far to not offend the Muslim world that they have failed to hold the necessary debate about what the roots of Islamic radicalism really are. Without an honest debate about the ideas that fuel each side in this war, America cannot win the "War of Ideas." Making matters worse, many United States leaders refuse to engage in this discussion.

This debate should start with the fact that this war is really between the "houses of democracy" and the "fortresses of authoritarianism." These terms could also describe the opposing sides in both the Cold War and World War II, except the ideologies of both the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany/Imperial Japan were political, not religious. Terror and Middle East expert Walid Phares describes democracy as the best form of government as yet experienced by humans, because at its root it eschews pluralism, open society, rule of law, accountability, human rights, and self-determination.³⁸ Refusing to discuss what is at the root of Islamic radicalism is nonsensical, because refusal to acknowledge where the movement gets its inspiration is handicapping United States national leadership from countering it

³⁷ Walid Phares, *The War of Ideas: Jihadism Against Democracy* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007), xxi.

³⁸ Ibid., xv-xvi.

effectively. From the historical record, it is clear that Islamic radical leaders get their inspiration from the Koran, the Hadith, and from the example of the Prophet Mohammed. The evidence is clear that what is written in the Koran is being imitated by Islamic radical leaders in Iran, by Hamas in the West Bank, by Hezbollah in Lebanon, by the Taliban in Afghanistan, by Al Qaeda in numerous countries around the world, and by some American citizens here at home.³⁹

The current Administration is attempting to build better relations with the Muslim world, and one way they are doing this is by leaving the words ‘Islam’ and ‘Jihad’ out of the discussion about today’s “War on Terror,” Overseas Contingency Operations, the Christmas Day bomber, or the Major Hasan Fort Hood massacre. This represents failure to fully engage in the debate and to understand the ideological roots of the problem that Americans face in Islamic radicalism. This approach does not serve Americans well, and moderate Muslims are done an even greater disservice, because this approach fails to distinguish them from radical Muslims. The problem is not specific to the current Administration; President Bush’s decision in 2001 to declare “War on Terror” did not set the dialogue in the proper context either. United States national leaders have yet to hold the necessary debate about who America is fighting, and why Islamic radicals are so inspired.

During the Cold War, President Reagan was thought by some to be unwise when he spoke quite bluntly about the Soviet Union. Speaking at a convention in Florida in March 1983, he referred to the Soviet Union as the “focus of evil in the modern world;”⁴⁰ these comments were not well received by critics that wanted the President to court Moscow

³⁹ “Recent Cases Show Challenge of US Terrorists,” Newsmax, 17 March 2010. <http://newsmax.com/Newsfront/US-American-Jihadists/2010/03/17/id/353054> (accessed 17 March 2010).

⁴⁰ President Ronald Reagan, “Evil Empire Speech,” 8 March 1983. <http://www.nationalcenter.org/ReaganEvilEmpire1983.html> (accessed 23 February 2010).

diplomatically, and they chided him that he should tread more sensibly with regards to the Soviets. Besides large numbers of forces and missiles deployed to deter Moscow, the largest battle was the “War of Ideas:” democracy versus authoritarianism. The ideological basis for the Soviet system was communism, and the President was not afraid to call it what it was, evil. For example, the Soviets, under Stalin, in the 1930s and 1940s, killed close to 10 million people in so called labor camps in pursuit of economic viability for the State. Ironically, at one of these camps, Kolyma, was the sign, “Labour is a matter of honour, valour, and heroism.”⁴¹

President Bush was castigated for using a similar term following 9-11 when he described Iran, Iraq, and North Korea as the “Axis of Evil” in reference to their collective exportation of terror, but he stopped short of properly describing our enemy, and instead declared war on a method by naming our current conflict the “Global War on Terror.” He did identify our enemies as terrorists of global reach and those states that support them. However, as stated earlier, the real debate has failed to materialize due to an apologetic West that is steering clear of the debate about who its enemy really is. As Walid Phares stated in his book, *War of Ideas*:

What are the choices available to the West as the War of Ideas unfolds---for policymakers, the media, strategic planners, individuals, and communities? The worst choice, an unacceptable option, is to dodge the debate, flee the intellectual confrontation, and play the ostrich, putting our heads in the sand and convincing ourselves that the problem doesn’t exist---and indeed, as has been shown, the Wahhabi lobbies are only too ready to support the “choice” of believing that jihad as a violent, totalitarian ideology is not a reality.⁴²

The problem in the United States’ Information War is not so much a problem of coordination, but America’s failure to honestly and comprehensively discuss her enemy’s

⁴¹ Paul Johnson, *Modern Times*, (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1991), 304-305.

⁴² Walid Phares, *War of Ideas: Jihadism Against Democracy* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007), 245-246.

ideology and its roots, seemingly due to our fear of offending or insulting the Muslim world. This debate would reveal that America's enemy, the jihadists, as Phares calls them, came to the fore after the demise of the Soviet Union. They reject the leadership role of advanced democracies, and they need to be countered in America's schools, prisons, and in her government. After America sets clear priorities for countering the enemy's message while promoting her own, economic aid can be appropriately leveraged to promote freedom and democracy.

Economic

Economics is enmeshed in both diplomatic and military instruments of power. Foreign aid to allies and economic sanctions against adversaries are tools that the United States Government regularly uses in advancing foreign policy, and both have been used in the current war against Islamic radicalism. According to the Office of Management and Budget, the President's 2011 budget request includes \$4B for Afghanistan assistance and \$3.1B for Pakistan assistance to "disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan by increasing assistance to both countries, providing funds for governance, reconstruction, and other development activities that will counter extremists." For Iraq \$2.6B is requested to enable the State Department (DOS) to assume responsibilities previously held by the Defense Department such as police capacity building, and to enable DOS to provide security and logistics support for civilians deployed to Iraq. Additionally, \$4.5B supplemental funding is included to "advance the President's strategy in Afghanistan and Pakistan," and to support the transition of responsibilities from Defense to State in Iraq.⁴³ Since 9-11, \$56B in foreign aid has been spent in support of the "War on Terror" with the

⁴³ Department of State and Other International Programs, The President's Budget FY2011 Fact Sheet. http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/factsheet_department_state/ (accessed 27 February 2010).

bulk of these monies supporting operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.⁴⁴ This amount is minuscule, and should be increased relative to defense spending to increase development in target countries in hopes of reducing the enormous number of ‘recruitable’ young men to the Islamic radical cause.

Whether or not this aid is producing the desired effect depends on the foreign policy issue in question. Writing for the Heritage Foundation, Brett Schaeffer and Anthony Kim argued in August 2008 that ‘voter confidence’ (getting United Nations members to support the United States’ position) sunk to a new low (18%) in 2007 from a post-Cold War high (over 50%) in 1995, compared to a Cold War average 31%. This seems to indicate that aid is not helping the United States’ position on the global stage,⁴⁵ and that United States national leaders need to critically review their aid priorities in the “War on Terror,” which, according to the FY11 budget, are Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq. Whether this aid is improving America’s image in these target countries is a question which takes patience to fully answer, but in Pakistan in summer 2009, for instance, only 16% of the population viewed America favorably.⁴⁶ This is not a good sign.

In September 2008 the Treasury Department sanctioned Abdul Reza Shahlai, a deputy commander in Iran’s Qods Force, and Akram Abas al Kabi, a senior Mahdi Army leader, among a total of five persons and two corporations who had their assets blocked by the United States Treasury under executive order. These individuals had been found to be

⁴⁴ Amy Belasco, “The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11 (RL33110),” Congressional Research Service, 15 May 2009, Summary. <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/125514.pdf> (accessed 26 January 2010).

⁴⁵ Brett Schaefer and Anthony Kim, “How Do U.S. Foreign Aid Recipients Vote at the U.N.? Against the U.S.” The Heritage Foundation, 18 August 2008. <http://www.heritage.org/research/internationalorganizations/bg2171.cfm> (accessed 27 February 2010).

⁴⁶ “Survey: Obama does little to nudge global Muslim views of America,” CNN Politics, 23 July 2009. <http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2009/07/23/survey-obama-does-little-to-nudge-global-muslim-views-of-america/?fbid=nBtZ5UMFrB> (accessed 29 March 2010).

key planners in attacks on Iraqis, the Government of Iraq, and Coalition and United States troops in Iraq, most notably a January 2007 attack on a Joint Provincial Coordination Center in Karbala.⁴⁷ Russia continues to oppose new sanctions proposed by the United States and/or the international community against Iran and their nuclear weapons program, because, they say, it would ‘paralyze’ the country [Iran]. This is frustrating but not surprising as Russia and Iran have been longtime partners. Russia is considering selling an air defense system to Iran, and they would do it tomorrow if they were not so concerned about regional tensions. Still pending is the Russian transfer of S-300 missiles to Iran, a contract that the two countries signed in 2007.⁴⁸ In June 2009, the United States supported the United Nations resolution which placed sanctions against North Korea for conducting an underground nuclear test; these sanctions prohibited all weapons exports and allowed only small arms imports.⁴⁹ The Obama Administration, in hopes of moving Syria away from its historic alliance with Iran, and to stabilize Iraq, Lebanon, and the Palestinian territories, has moved to ease sanctions against Syria which would allow the flow of aircraft parts, information-technology products, and telecommunications equipment. Israel, Egypt, and Syrian democracy activists are concerned that relieving pressure on Syria will curtail its willingness to cut ties to Hezbollah, Hamas, and to create more political openness. Said one activist in Washington, ”Damascus

⁴⁷ Bill Roggio, “US Sanctions Iranian General for Aiding Iraqi Terror Groups,” The Long War Journal, 16 September 2008. http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2008/09/us_sanctions_iranian.php (accessed 27 February 2010).

⁴⁸ Russia Opposes ‘Paralyzing’ Sanctions Against Iran, VOA [Voice of America] News, 24 February 2010. <http://waronterrornews.typepad.com/home/2010/02/russia-opposes-paralyzing-sanctions-against-iran.html> (accessed 27 February 2010).

⁴⁹ Ewen MacAskill, “UN approves ‘unprecedented’ sanctions against North Korea over nuclear test,” guardian.co.uk, 12 June 2009. <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/jun/12/un-north-korea-nuclear-sanctions> (accessed 27 February 2010).

feels like it's getting a lot without giving up anything.”⁵⁰ Sanctions are a powerful tool if used properly, and though they are being used to support the United States’ current war against states that support the use of terror and Islamic radical ideology, they should be enforced to help secure United States’ national security objectives.

Although heavily dependent on its military, the United States Government is using all instruments of national power in the fight against Islamic radicalism. Strides are being made to improve diplomatic efforts abroad, and economic initiatives are having some success. Meanwhile, gaps still remain in homeland security, and the United States remains in an ‘uphill battle’ in the Information War. The National Security Staff is coordinating actions for the President, however, Congress also has a critical oversight role which must be considered.

Congressional Oversight

The United States Congress is charged with oversight of the United States Government’s effort to protect America in the fight against Islamic radicalism and those states that support, export, or practice terror against the American people and/or American interests. The Congress must ensure that the President has established both feasible, acceptable, and suitable national security objectives and a clearly defined endstate. They must ensure that he clearly tasks his cabinet secretaries, that the departments of the federal government are effectively pursuing national security objectives, and that his national security apparatus is effectively coordinating the war to produce a more secure, productive, and free America. In the Senate for instance, the Foreign Relations, Armed Services, Homeland Security and Government Affairs, and Budget Oversight committees each have

⁵⁰ Jay Solomon, “U.S. Woos Damascus by Easing Export Ban,” Wall Street Journal, 28 July 2009. <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124873789302385169.html> (accessed 27 February 2010).

important roles in ensuring that the Administration is properly fighting the war, how many troops are required and for how long, and in monitoring the expenditure of national treasure. Two and six year terms are obstacles to enduring and comprehensive oversight, as politicians, once in office, have to serve their constituents first, and must concern themselves with winning recurring reelections. Regardless of election cycles, the Congress of the United States must be held accountable by the American people to keep national security leaders honest in the continued fight to counter Islam radicalism; this requires a concerned and informed public.

CHAPTER THREE: PUBLIC SUPPORT

Back in 1941: Then and Now

That it took Al Qaeda's 9-11 massacre in New York, Washington, and Pennsylvania to force America to take decisive action [against Al Qaeda] is beyond frustrating, but it is not surprising if one compares the events from the mid 1990s to 11 September 2001 with those of the late 1930s and the early 1940s in pre-World War II America. After the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, the American public was outraged and overwhelmingly supportive of going to war against both Japan and Germany.¹ By this time, Japan had been fighting relentlessly for over four years, had sunk a United States gunboat, the Panay, damaged three Standard Oil tankers in July 1937, captured most of China's cities and fertile farmlands in 1937-1938, and moved on several other Asian countries in sealing off what they considered to be their 'resources area.' During this period, the American populace was genuinely more interested in events emanating from Europe, was markedly noninterventionist in response to Japan, and the Roosevelt Administration merely curtailed the sale of airplanes and a host of other products to Imperial Japan.² Meanwhile, Hitler's Germany annexed Austria, took over the Sudetenland and the whole of Czechoslovakia, and had by that time initiated his subjugation of all Jews in any country under Nazi control. Still, up to early 1939, most Americans believed that war in Europe was not going to happen. However, that all began to change after Germany invaded Poland and then France, and compelled France to agree to an armistice in June 1940.³ Prior to the German invasion of France, in early May 1940, a meager seven percent of Americans supported [an American]

¹ Ralph Levering, *The Public and American Foreign Policy, 1918-1978* (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1978), 82.

² Ibid., 72.

³ Ibid., 73-74.

declaration of war immediately “without being attacked.”⁴ Finally, following the Pearl Harbor attack, years of noninterventionist policies were brushed aside, and President Roosevelt appealed to Congress in his “Day of Infamy” speech. The news of 21 sunk navy ships, 188 destroyed aircraft, and 2,403 dead servicemen⁵ left an indelible mark on the minds of the collective American conscience, the response was predictably overwhelming, and the people wanted revenge immediately. Congress instantly declared war against Japan, and against Germany days later. During the 41 months until Victory in Europe (V-E) day and the 44 months until Victory in Japan (V-J) day, public support for the war remained high, largely attributable to the peoples’ understanding of what the war was about, to their belief that the Allies were winning, and to their approval of President Roosevelt’s handling of the war.⁶ In comparison, why has public support for the current, unfinished war against Islamic radicalism plummeted?

The popular answer in this debate is that it has simply taken too long, and many in the voting public do not believe that what is going on ‘over there’ matters to them anymore. This argument is often coupled with explanations of election cycles and the fact that politicians cannot afford to pay attention during multiple extended military campaigns. In this case, campaigns which have claimed over 5,000 troops and not secured complete victory. Proponents for withdrawal argue that United States troops’ presence there only inflames the

⁴ Ibid., 78.

⁵ *World War II in HD*, The History Channel, 2009. Accessable at <http://www.history.com/shows/wwii-in-hd>.

⁶ Hadley Cantril, *The Human Dimension: Experiences in Policy Research* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1967), 48. <http://www.talkingpointsmemo.com/docs/wwii-polls/> (accessed 28 February 2010).

intensity of the insurgency's resolve, and that for every day we stay in Iraq, Iran also grows stronger.⁷

In the current fight not only is America's military heavily committed overseas (along with the interagency), but others, especially those in the Justice, Homeland Security, and Treasury Departments, are fighting at home. Meanwhile, globalized media has drastically transformed the conduct of war. News reports once took weeks before they could inform the population; news organizations now flash events from the battlefield to the living room almost instantaneously, which has brought the viewing public into the national decision cycle quicker than ever before.

Complicating the current war is that the United States is not fighting a nation-state with sitting government, standing army, and a homogenous populace, but rather a collection of groups, or more simply, a movement. A movement that goes by many names: Islamic Radicalism, Jihadism, Muslim Extremism, or Salafism and Khumeinism; there are certainly more. Unlike fighting the political machines of Nazi Germany or Imperial Japan, America is now fighting a religiously based ideological movement, and this has many national leaders nervous. More than ever, America's national motto, "E Pluribus Unum: Out of Many, One," is being threatened sincerely. Historically, people have come from around the world to live freely in America. That has always worked for America, but only because those who have come here have agreed to be one, not a collection of ones: to defend the constitution, embrace democracy, enjoy freedom of religion, salute the flag, learn English, serve the public good, and provide for the common defense. The fact remains that there are thousands in Islamic radicalism who want America not only out of the Middle East, they want to

⁷ John Weiss, "Why We Should Leave Iraq Now," History News Network, 9 October 2006. <http://hnn.us/articles/30488.html> (accessed 28 February 2010).

destroy her and to establish Sharia Law in place of the US Constitution here at home. This desire to defeat America is basic to their goals and Americans are foolish to ignore it. Regardless of the differences in the character of the threat and the lengthy duration of the current war, the American people must persevere no matter how long it takes.

Public Opinion After 9-11

When President Bush addressed Congress on 20 September 2001, an overwhelming majority of Americans wanted action against Al Qaeda and the Taliban, closely mirroring the type of post-Pearl Harbor fervor that swept the country in favor of action against the Japanese. To be true, President Bush was not requesting a declaration of war, but explaining his rationale for why American had to take action to unseat the Taliban Government in Kabul and to destroy Al Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan (Operation Enduring Freedom: OEF), and to defeat terrorists of global reach and those countries who support them. On 18 September, Congress had already approved Senate Joint Resolution 23 authorizing military force against those responsible for the “recent attacks” against the United States.⁸

Sustaining popular support in war is directly linked to people understanding why their nation is fighting, believing in their national leadership and that the fight is worth the cost in national treasure, both in terms of fiscal resources and in manpower, and then continually realizing that the threat is dangerous to the country. In late September 2001, with images of close to 3,000 dead Americans in New York, Washington, DC, and near Shanksville, PA, the President did not have to do much convincing that Al Qaeda was a severe threat to America, an astounding 86% of Americans believed that President Bush was doing a favorable job in

⁸ Senate Joint Resolution 23: A joint resolution to authorize the use of United States Armed Forces against those responsible for the recent attacks launched against the United States, Library of Congress, 18 September 2001. <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d107:s.j.res.00023>: (accessed 1 March 2010).

leading the country in the aftermath of 9-11; 57% believed that military action was mostly important to prevent future attacks.⁹

By April 2002, American popular support for the United States war in Afghanistan (OEF) remained high at 83%.¹⁰ In January 2003, 56% of Americans approved of how the President was handling Iraq, although a growing number thought he had not yet made a clear case for going to war there.¹¹ In March, once the war was underway, seven in ten Americans supported the use of military force to oust Sadaam Hussein from power,¹² though public support had dropped to 60% by October 2003.¹³ By February 2005, 47% of Americans thought that using military force to oust Sadaam Hussein was wrong in the first place, up from 30% since the March 2003 invasion,¹⁴ 23 months prior.

Meanwhile, public support for domestic measures, such as increased security at airports, tighter immigration regulations, selective wiretapping, and freezing financial assets of persons with ties to terror groups has been mixed, ranging from September 2001 when only 34% were concerned that new counter terror (CT) laws would restrict civil liberties, to June 2002 when 49% of the public was concerned that CT efforts undermined civil

⁹ "Military Action A Higher Priority Than Homeland Defense," The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, 27 September 2001. <http://peoplepress.org/report/?pageid=101> (accessed 1 March 2010).

¹⁰ "Americans and Europeans Differ Widely on Foreign Policy Issues," The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, 17 April 2002. <http://peoplepress.org/report/153/americans-and-europeans-differ-widely-on-foreign-policy-issues> (accessed 1 March 2010).

¹¹ "Public Wants Proof of Iraqi Weapons Programs," The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, 16 January 2003. <http://peoplepress.org/report/170/public-wants-proof-of-iraqi-weapons-programs> (accessed 1 March 2010).

¹² "Public Confidence In War Effort Falters," The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, 25 March 2003. <http://peoplepress.org/report/177/public-confidence-in-war-effort-falters> (accessed 1 March 2010).

¹³ "President's Criticism of Media Resonates, But Iraq Unease Grows," The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, 21 October 2003. <http://peoplepress.org/report/195/presidents-criticism-of-media-resonates-but-iraq-unease-grows> (accessed 1 March 2010).

¹⁴ "More Optimism on Iraq, But Most Expect Long U.S. Stay," The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, February 24, 2005. <http://peoplepress.org/report/237/more-optimism-on-iraq-but-most-expect-long-us-stay> (accessed 2 March 2010).

liberties.¹⁵ In September 2002, one year after the attacks, 35% of those polled believed that this signaled the start of a war between Islam and the West, while an additional 19% believed that the current conflict could turn into a war between Islam and the West.¹⁶

The argument over whether the President shapes public opinion or is constrained by it in wartime has been debated in every war. President Roosevelt did not have to work too hard to leverage public opinion in support of action against Japan due to the devastation of Pearl Harbor, and much the same could be said of President Bush after 9-11; the people overwhelmingly wanted action against Al Qaeda and the Taliban. During the Vietnam War, President Nixon, although he ran on an “end the Vietnam War” platform, had to battle the anti-war left over the speed of troop withdrawals, and finally chose to appeal to the “Silent Majority” and sent Vice President Agnew to duel with the media.¹⁷ In the aftermath of huge demonstrations in Washington and around the country, President Nixon claimed that foreign policy should not be made by mobs in the street, but by elected leaders and foreign policy experts. Carl von Clausewitz, in his classic, *On War*, described the paradoxical trinity as primordial violence, hatred, and enmity. He associated these terms with the people or passion, the commander and his army or chance, and the government or reason, and argued that balance was needed between these three poles to support the prosecution of war by the state.¹⁸ This tension factored prominently as the Nixon foreign policy team deliberated how

¹⁵ “Domestic Concerns will Vie with Terrorism in Fall,” The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, 27 June 2002. <http://people-press.org/report/?pageid=621> (accessed 1 March 2010).

¹⁶ “One Year Later: New Yorkers More Troubled, Washingtonians More On Edge,” The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, 5 September 2002. <http://people-press.org/report/160/one-year-later-new-yorkers-more-troubled-washingtonians-more-on-edge> (accessed 2 March 2010).

¹⁷ Ralph Levering, *The Public and American Foreign Policy, 1918-1978* (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1978), 134-136.

¹⁸ Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Editors and Translators (New York: Everyman’s Library, 1993), 101.

to end the war with honor in the late 1960s and early 1970s. This same tension between national leadership and the American people has been apparent since 9-11.

Public Support Today

Close to nine years and two presidential elections later, America's war against Islamic radicalism continues. Public opinion varies widely on topics ranging from whether the nation is at war or not, to the right troop levels in Iraq and Afghanistan, to appropriate war spending, to the President's strategy in Afghanistan and supporting interagency coordination, to appropriate immigration restrictions, and to adequate airport security and domestic surveillance. Clearly, the groups that make up Islamic radicalism are still active in planning and attempting attacks against the United States, the American people, and American interests. United States forces are fatigued, and the Government is expending national resources to continue the fight in Afghanistan while the country draws down in Iraq. Making clear his intentions over the next 18 months, President Obama has stated that he plans to withdraw all combat troops from Iraq by summer 2010, and to start the deliberate withdrawal of combat troops from Afghanistan by summer 2011. These announcements were made to reassure an anxious political base, if not the entire American populace.

While the President deliberated his strategy for Afghanistan in September 2009, it was calculated that 76% of the American people believed that if the Taliban controlled Afghanistan again, they would present a serious threat to the United States.¹⁹ Here at home after the Major Hasan massacre that killed 13 at Fort Hood in November 2009, only 52% of Americans reportedly were significantly concerned about Islamic extremism in the United States, barely a majority. Nonetheless, the American populace got jolted again when the 2009

¹⁹ "Public Support for Afghan Mission Slips: But Most See Possible Taliban Takeover as Major Threat," The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, 22 September 2009. <http://people-press.org/report/546/afghanistan> (accessed 2 March 2010).

Christmas day bomber was subdued on a flight approaching Detroit. By January 2010 only 33% of Americans believed that terrorists' ability to attack the United States was greater than it was on 9-11. This seemingly runs counter to the estimated 58% of Americans that think that the Administration's anti-terror policies are not doing enough to protect the country.²⁰ Even so, as of January 2010, dealing with terrorism was in the top three (80% of Americans believe that it is one of the Administration's top public priorities) among America's most pressing issues, while the economy (83%) and jobs (81%) are only slightly ahead in the minds of concerned Americans.

In all, the predominant public view is that America is fighting a war in Afghanistan, winding down another war in Iraq, and countering terrorism here at home. United States' current security efforts are not seen as total war against Islamic radicalism or jihadism. Following 9-11, then-President Bush consistently remarked that America should go on with their daily lives, and that the military 'had the fight.' He seemingly made these types of comments to reassure the public that he would keep them safe, which is clearly an important aspect of the Commander-in-Chief's role; unfortunately though, he failed to describe adequately the necessary sacrifices that the American people would have to make to win the war against Islamic radicalism, an ideological war with implications comparable to either the Cold War or World War II. Later, during the 2008 Presidential election, then-Senator Obama won while casting himself as the candidate that would most concern himself with domestic issues such as jobs, the economy, and health care. The threat of Islamic radicalism did not play a prominent role for Americans in the 2008 election.²¹ Whether this was complacency to

²⁰ "Obama Image Unscathed By Terrorism Controversy," The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, 14 January 2010. <http://people-press.org/report/578/> (accessed 2 March 1010).

²¹ Christopher Bellavita, "Changing Homeland Security: The Year in Review – 2008," Homeland Security Affairs 5, no. 1 (January 2009): 4-5. <http://www.hsaj.org/?article=5.1.1> (accessed 21 October 2009).

the threat of Islamic radicalism or distraction by more pressing domestic concerns remains to be seen.

Sixteen months later, in February 2010, and for the first time in over three and a half months since the incident, the Obama Administration acknowledged that Islamic terrorism was “part and parcel” of the Fort Hood massacre that left 13 dead and dozens injured in November 2009. Secretary Napolitano also stated during congressional testimony that the Christmas day bomber had Islamic terrorism motivations, as did several other incidents in the past year.²² This is a good sign. The question is now whether national leadership will use this information as a stepping stone to explain to the American people that, like it or not, the United States is at war with Islamic radicalism.

²² “Ft. Hood Attack Publicly Called ‘Terrorism,’” Fox News, 24 February 2010. <http://liveshots.blogs.foxnews.com/2010/02/24/ft-hood-attack-publicly-called-terrorism/> (accessed 26 February 2010).

CONCLUSION

In America today, much like Wilberforce's war against the 18th century British slave trade, the United States is in a crucial battle of ideas against a vicious enemy that wants to kill thousands, if not millions, of Americans and, ultimately defeat the United States. This war has democracy, freedom, educational opportunity, and open society pitted against Islamic radicalism, oppression, Islamic radicalism's desire to impose Sharia Law in America, and authoritarianism. Confounding United States' national leadership is the fact that America is not fighting a nation-state, but a collection of state and non-state actors such as Al Qaeda, Iran, the Taliban, and the Muslim Brotherhood who are fighting an asymmetric war against America.

Islamic radicalism's threat to America is real, severe, and as dangerous as that of Soviet Russia or Fascist Germany. Osama Bin Laden and the Worldwide Islamic Front declared war against America in 1996, and since that time, Al Qaeda and Islamic radical forces have killed thousands of Americans in places such as Tanzania, Kenya, Yemen, the United States, Afghanistan, and Iraq, and they are far from defeated. Al Qaeda central continues to operate from northwest Pakistan, has affiliates across the globe, and continues to collude with the Taliban and other similar groups to continue the fight against America. Iran is fighting the United States and Israel through proxies like Hezbollah and is deeply committed to developing nuclear weapons. Here at home, like no other war in United States history, groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood are heavily invested in defeating America no matter how long it takes. They are committed to doing so by portraying Islam as a religion of peace in the educational system and in academia, by recruiting members from the prison system for violent jihad, by "outbreeding" other

portions of the American populace, and by infiltrating United States Government to build both greater acceptance of Islam and complacency about Islamic radicalism.

Since 9-11, America's strategy to counter Islamic radicalism has ranged from haphazard to comprehensive, has tended to be overly dependent on the military instrument of power, and has not been consistently explained by national leadership to the public. President Bush stated initially that America's enemies are terror groups of global reach and countries that support those groups, and then went to war against the Taliban, Al Qaeda, and Iraq, and initiated significant reforms to protect Americans at home. President Obama has focused since on dialogue with adversary nations, enhanced both United States military and interagency efforts in Afghanistan, redeployed troops from Iraq, and has adopted a more domestic focus.

Successive National Security Strategies by President Bush have incorporated all instruments of national power, though President Obama has yet to publish one. Cabinet secretaries have focused as tasked on winning the "war on terror," although the Executive Branch has seemed less than focused on coordinating the United States' war against Islamic radicalism. If America is to succeed, the National Security Staff's role will be essential in coordinating both domestic and foreign policy against a determined enemy that is both elusive and adaptable. Clearly, the non-state character of our enemy has significantly challenged United States' national leadership, and winning this war will require a greater Information effort than the United States, to date, has been willing to plan and/or envision.

The United States Government has used all instruments of national power to fight the "War on Terror," here at home and abroad, although improvement needs to be made in

their coordination. Diplomatically, national leaders have worked hard to reach out to traditional allies, such as Great Britain, and to our partners, especially in the Muslim world, such as Pakistan, to build and sustain support for the “War on Terror.” Gaining allies in the fight in Afghanistan has been relatively easy in comparison to the campaign in Iraq, and although now the transition to Iraqi control is well underway, the challenge to maintain allies both in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere is crucial. Clearly, this fight is unsustainable if United States attempts to fight it unilaterally.

Economically, the United States has contributed \$56B in foreign aid since 9-11, mostly to Iraq and Afghanistan, but also to Pakistan¹ and others to support stable governments, rejuvenate economies, and help build professional security forces. United States national leaders need to look for ways to increase development spending relative to defense spending. This would be a force multiplier in support of national security goals and would help address one of the root causes of Islamic radicalism. United States national leaders also need to continue the use of sanctions, like those against Iran, but they must also be willing to enforce them.

America’s military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq in support of the “War on Terror” have been the most newsworthy, and have cost close to \$940B² through 2009, 5,300 troops killed in action,³ and another 36,000 wounded in action.⁴ America has removed the Taliban from power, destroyed Al Qaeda training camps and severely

¹ Amy Belasco, “The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11 (RL33110),” Congressional Research Service, 15 May 2009, Summary.
<http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/125514.pdf> (accessed 26 January 2010).

² Ibid., Table 3. <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/125514.pdf> (accessed 26 January 2010).

³ “Faces of the Fallen,” The Washington Post. <http://projects.washingtonpost.com/fallen/> (accessed 17 February 2010).

⁴ “Honor the Fallen,” Iraq and Afghanistan Veterans of America. <http://iava.org/> (accessed 17 February 2010).

degraded their leadership, and now remains committed to training Afghan security forces, to killing hardened Taliban and or Al Qaeda fighters, and to continued stability operations. America also effected regime change in Iraq, helped bring democratic government there, is planning to withdraw combat forces in summer 2010, and will leave training teams to continue developing Iraqi security forces. As in Afghanistan, the United States Government is working to help indigenous forces defeat undeterred fighters opposed to the new Iraqi Government. The United States has committed national treasure, both money and lives, to winning the current conflict. No doubt, ongoing operations will require more from an already stressed defense budget, will result in more casualties, and will present difficult choices. America must be resolute in its pursuit of hardened insurgents. She must continue to train indigenous security forces in order to build Iraqi and Afghani security capacity. Finally, military support to our diplomatic personnel must be expanded to empower civilian authority. Anything less is unacceptable.

Additionally, the Departments of Homeland Security, Justice, and Treasury have exerted extensive domestic effort to protect Americans by tightening immigration policy and practice, by initiating increased surveillance of suspicious individuals, and by detecting groups, organizations, or individuals with financial ties to terror groups. These efforts must continue despite real or perceived inconveniences for travelers or guardians of civil liberties. As long as events like the Hasan Fort Hood massacre, the Detroit Christmas day incident, and groups raising terror money under the guise of charitable organizations continue to be discovered, these additional measures should remain.

The biggest mistake United States' national leaders have made has been creating the impression in America that the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are the sum total of the "War on Terror." Further, leadership's failure to convey the magnitude of the current "War of Ideas," and its importance in the context of this conflict is unacceptable. Although President Bush called out terror groups of global reach, those nations who support them, and specifically the "Axis of Evil," he mistakenly labeled the war against the perpetrators of 9-11, the "War on Terror." President Obama has seemingly portrayed this fight as three separate wars: the one in Afghanistan, the one in Iraq, and, now reluctantly, only after the Fort Hood massacre and the Christmas day incident, the one at home. The fact is that America is in one massive "War of Ideas" with Islamic radicalism, and United States national leaders have failed to debate publicly and nationally the character of this war.

To win the "War of Ideas" America first must debate what this term means, who the enemy is, and then devise a strategy to attack the ideas of the enemy, while promoting her own. United States national leaders have to expose supposed moderate Islamic leaders, such as those from Council for American-Islamic Relations or Newsweek Editor, Fareed Zakaria. CAIR would prefer to remove any reference to Islam from the debate about what this war is about.⁵ In the February 2009 Newsweek cover story, Mr. Zakaria stated that Al Qaeda has already lost and that moderate Muslim leaders have already won, signaling that the war is over;⁶ wishful thinking from Newsweek's editor. This mentality is exactly what Islamic radical leaders want. The writer of the modern classic *Chronicles of Narnia*,

⁵ Brigitte Gabriel, *They Must Be Stopped*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2008), 73-115.

⁶ Liz Blaine, "Newsweek Declares the End of War on Terror," Frontpagemag.com, 8 Mar 2010. <http://frontpage.com/2010/03/08/newsweek-declares-the-end-of-war-on-terror/> (accessed 10 March 2010).

Clyve Staples (C.S.) Lewis, described it this way when he wrote about man's decision whether or not to believe in the devil:

There are two equal and opposite errors into which our race can fall about the devils. One is to disbelieve in their existence. The other is to believe, and to have an excessive and unhealthy interest in them.⁷

The fact remains that America is at war against any individual, group, or nation state that uses Islam (or any religion) to rationalize attacks on United States citizens. The United States should not be apologetic about including Islam in this national security discussion since terror attacks against America, especially since 1996, have been consistently executed by groups with Islamic radical ideologies.

Winning the war at home is vital to America's war against Islamic radicalism. Perhaps the greatest fight is in her classrooms, where young minds first start learning. America's national leaders must ensure that American elementary and secondary age school children are given an honest assessment of state, United States, and world history, whether they are in public or private schools, and this includes Islamic schools, which have been heavily funded by foreign investment, often from Saudi Arabia. The Department of Education is a necessary, if surprising, member of the nation's fight against Islamic radicalism. Education has been irresponsible in failing to monitor what is taught in primary and secondary educational institutions in America.⁸ In America's universities, national leaders cannot allow the constant flow of foreign, often Saudi Arabian, money to establish and sustain supposed "Middle Eastern Studies" programs that merely promote greater acceptance of Islam, without holding such schools, and the

⁷ C.S. Lewis, *The Screwtape Letters*, Revised Paperback Edition (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1982), 3.

⁸ Walid Phares, *The War of Ideas: Jihadism Against Democracy* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007), 194.

countries where this money comes from, to account for the harmful influence they have on some students in America.

Meanwhile, the Department of Justice must continue surveillance of suspicious individuals in America to include those recruited to Islamic radicalism in America's prisons. Finally, within the United States' Government, national leaders must expose supposed moderate Islamic leaders (CAIR, Muslim Brotherhood, etc.) who, frankly, do not allow any discussion of Islam in the context of the current war against the perpetrators of 9-11, the Iranian Government, or instigators of domestic incidents like the Fort Hood massacre and the Christmas day bomber incident in Detroit. These supposed moderate Islamic leaders prefer that United States' national leaders not have the necessary debate, nor develop the strategy, and surely do not want them to prosecute successfully the war against Islamic radicalism.

This blunder has been made before. In the 1940s, Franklin Roosevelt miscast Joseph Stalin as a man of reason with whom he could debate. How wrong he was is powerfully and soberly evident in the almost five-decade Cold War that embroiled these two nations.⁹ National leaders should not repeat the same mistake today by thinking that reasoning with the likes of Ahmedinejad or Bin Laden is going to be fruitful, or even possible.

United States public support runs deep, but it is perishable. When put to the test, the American people are ready to go to war against the country's enemies. When people understand what they are fighting for, realize the strategy that the nation is committed to, and see indicators of progress over time, they tend to support the continued commitment of the national treasury to winning with both troops and finances. Over time, this support

⁹ Paul Johnson, *A History of the American People* (New York: Harper Perennial, 1999), 789-791.

is eventually tested by realistic domestic pressures such as employment, education, and health care.

In the current war, which has lasted over eight years, the country has questioned both who the nation is fighting and the country's strategy; today that once robust public support is fragmented. People are complacent; distracted by realistic domestic pressures, they need to be sincerely reminded that the fight against Islamic radicalism is about national survival and is far from over. The President must state and restate who the United States is fighting, and why the country is fighting them. How many times he has to restate these truths is immaterial. Meanwhile, he has to ensure that the nation's strategy is sound and properly coordinated by his National Security leadership team.

Without this top-down leadership, the public is easily distracted, and this is just what America's enemies want. A distracted public would allow Islamic radical leaders to defeat them with both grand attacks at home and abroad. An honest, open, and ongoing debate, led by national leadership, about America's enemies and their intentions will expose these enemies of the United States and their designs on this great nation, and will help bolster public support for the war, lead to the defeat of Islamic radicalism, and continue to protect America. America's greatness will stand up to any argument, which is exactly why radical Islamic leaders do not want to have the argument. They would rather kill Americans.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

9/11 Commission. *9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States*, 22 Jul 2004. Cited from http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/911Report_Ch2.htm [accessed 16 Nov 09].

Arthur, Shirl. "A Conservative Estimate of Total Direct Aid to Israel: Almost \$114 Billion" Washington Report on Middle Eastern Affairs, November 2008. <http://wrmea.org/component/content/article/245-2008-november/3845-congress-watch-a-conservative-estimate-of-total-direct-us-aid-to-israel-almost-114-billion.html> [accessed 7 December 2009].

Bartlett, Henry C., Holman, Jr., G. Paul, and Somes, Timothy E. "The Art of Strategy and Force Planning," The Security, Strategy, and Forces Faculty, Ed., *Strategy and Force Planning*, Fourth Edition. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2004.

Belasco, Amy. "The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11 (RL33110)," Congressional Research Service, 15 May 2009. <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/125514.pdf> [accessed 26 January 2010].

---. "Troop Levels in the Afghan and Iraq Wars, FY2001-2012: Cost and Other Potential Issues (R40682)," Congressional Research Service, 2 July 2009. <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/126835.pdf> [accessed 26 January 2010].

Bellavita, Christopher. "Changing Homeland Security: The Year in Review – 2008," Homeland Security Affairs 5, no. 1 (January 2009). <http://www.hsaj.org/?article=5.1.1> [accessed 21 October 2009].

Benjamin, Daniel and Simon, Steven. *The Age of Sacred Terror*. New York: Random House, 2002.

Bin Laden, Osama. "Declaration of Jihad by Osama Bin Laden against the US - August 23, 1996." Terrorismfiles.org. http://www.terrorismfiles.org/individuals/declaration_of_jihad1.html [accessed 21 October 2009].

Blaine, Liz. "Newsweek Declares the End of War on Terror," Frontpagemag.com, 8 Mar 2010. <http://frontpage.com/2010/03/08/newsweek-declares-the-end-of-war-on-terror/> [accessed 10 March 2010].

Brokaw, Tom. *The Greatest Generation*. New York: Random House, 1998.

Burns, Robert and Baldor, Lolita C. "New Attacks Make Plain Al Qaeda's Resolve," *Virginian Pilot*, 9 January 2010.

Bush, George W., President. Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress of the United States, "Response to the Terrorist Attacks of September 11," September 20, 2001, Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents [September 21, 2001].

http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=2001_presidential_documents&docid=pd24se01_txt-26 [accessed 21 October 2009]: 1349.

CBS News. "Leaders of Fort Hood Inquiry Avoid Hasan Questions," 20 January 2010. <http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/01/20/ap/cabstatepent/main6120213.shtml> [accessed 30 January 2010].

Cable News Network Politics. "Survey: Obama does little to nudge global Muslim views of America," 23 July 2009. <http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2009/07/23/survey-obama-does-little-to-nudge-global-muslim-views-of-america/?fbid=nBtZ5UMFr> [accessed 29 March 2010].

Cantril, Hadley. *The Human Dimension: Experiences in Policy Research*. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1967.
<http://www.talkingpointsmemo.com/docs/wwii-polls/> [accessed 28 February 2010].

Central Intelligence Agency. *World Fact Book*, 30 November 2009. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html> [accessed 14 Dec 2009].

Chandler, Michael and Gunaratna, Rohan. *Countering Terrorism: Can We Meet the Threat of Global Violence?* London: Reaktion Books Ltd, 2007.

Clausewitz, Carl Von. *On War*. Edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. New York: Everyman's Library, 1993.

Cooper, Helene. "In Speech, Little Time Spent on National Security," The New York Times, 27 January 2010. <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/28/us/politics/28prexy.html> [accessed 31 January 2010].

Corbin, Jane. *Al Qaeda: In Search of the Terror Network that Threatens the World*. New York: Thunder's Mouth Press, 2002.

Cordesman, Anthony. "The True Lessons of Yemen and Detroit: How the US Must Expand and Redefine International Cooperation in Fighting Terrorism," Center for Strategic and International Studies, 25 January 2010.

Council on Foreign Relations. "Abu Sayyaf (Philippines, Islamic Separatists)," 27 May 2009. <http://www.cfr.org/publication/9235/> [accessed 15 February 2010].

Damon, Arwa, Todd, Brian, and McConnell, Dugald. "Americans Arrested in Pakistan had Bright Futures," Cable News Network US, 11 December 2009.

<http://www.cnn.com/2009/US/12/11/pakistan.americans.profiles/index.html> [accessed 8 February 2010].

Department of Defense. *National Defense Strategy*, 2008.

Editorial. "Who are Hamas?" BBC News, 4 January 2009.
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/1654510.stm> [accessed 15 February 2010].

Epstein, Susan, Nakamura, Kennon and Lawson, Marian. "State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs: FY2010 Budget and Appropriations (R40693)," Congressional Research Service, 29 December 2009.

<http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/138724.pdf> [accessed 26 January 2010].

Faces of the Fallen. *Washington Post*.

<http://projects.washingtonpost.com/fallen/iraq/page2/> [accessed 18 January 2010].

Fishel, Justin and Herridge, Catherine. "Obama Official Calls 'Fort Hood Massacre' Act of Terror," Fox News. <http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2010/01/15/time-obama-official-calls-fort-hood-massacre-act-terrorism/?test=latestnews> [accessed 15 January 2010].

Friedman, George. "The Christmas Day Airliner Attack and the Intelligence Process," Stratfor Global Intelligence, 4 January 2010.

http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20100104_christmas_day_airliner_attack_and_intelligence [accessed 8 January 2010].

Gabriel, Brigitte. *They Must Be Stopped*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 2008.

Gardham, Duncan. "Hidden Threat From Al Qaeda Sleeper Cells," Telegraph.co.uk, 27 November 2009. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/6672806/Hidden-threat-from-al-Qaeda-sleeper-cells.html> [accessed 31 January 2010].

Gaubatz, P. David and Sperry, Paul. *Muslim Mafia: Inside the Secret World That's Trying to Islamize America*. Los Angeles: World Net Daily, 2009.

GlobalSecurity.org. "Jemaah Islamiyah."

<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/ji.htm> [accessed 15 February 2010].

---. "Wahhabi." <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/gulf/wahhabi.htm> [accessed 17 February 2010].

Gunaratna, Rohan. *Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2002.

Handel, Michael I. *Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought*. Portland, OR: Frank Cass Publishers, 2003.

Hanson, Stephanie. "Al-Shabaab," Council on Foreign Relations, 27 February 2009. <http://www.cfr.org/publication/18650/> [accessed 25 January 2010].

Hanson, Victor Davis. *Ripples of Battle: How Wars of the Past Still Determine How We Fight, How We Live, and How We Think*. New York: Anchor Books, 2003.

Himelfarb, Joel. "FBI Severs CAIR Ties – Group's Credibility Takes a Hit from Holy Land Terror Trial," Accuracy in Media, 9 February 2009. <http://www.aim.org/guest-column/fbi-severs-cair-ties-groups-credibility-takes-a-hit-from-holy-land-terror-t/> [accessed 16 February 2010].

Hiltermann, Joost R. "Disorder on the Border: Saudi Arabia's War Inside Yemen," Foreign Affairs, 16 December 2009. <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65730/joost-r-hiltermann/disorder-on-the-border> [accessed 18 February 2010].

History Channel, *World War II in HD*, 2009. Accessable at <http://www.history.com/shows/wwii-in-hd>.

Hoffman, Bruce. "Outlook: Al-Qaeda's Grand New Strategy," Washington Post Online, 11 January 2010. www.washingtonpost.com [accessed 19 January 2010].

Hsu, Spencer S. "Hasan's Ties to Radical Cleric Raise Issues for Law Enforcement," *Washington Post*, 18 November 2009. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/11/17/AR2009111703830.html> [accessed 15 January 2010].

International Institute for Strategic Studies. "31 December 2009 - Global Arab Network - Iran and Al-Qaeda Source of Growing Terror in Yemen." <http://www.iiss.org/whats-new/iiss-in-the-press/december-2009/iran-and-al-qaeda-source-of-growing-terror-in-yemen/> [accessed 18 February 2010].

Investigative Project on Terrorism. "The Council on American-Islamic Relations." <http://www.investigativeproject.org/profile/172> [accessed 17 February 2010].

Iraq and Afghanistan Veterans of America. "Honor the Fallen." <http://iava.org/> [accessed 17 February 2010].

Jelinek, Pauline. "Military Divorce Rates Climbing Amid Stress of War," Philadelphia Inquirer, 29 November 2009. http://www.philly.com/inquirer/world_us/20091129_Military_divorce_rates_climbing_a_mid_stress_of_war.html [accessed 19 February 2010].

Johnson, Keith. "White House Scrambles for TSA Head," Wall Street Journal, 28 March 2010. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304434404575149824210974044.html?mod=googlenews_wsj [accessed 28 March 2010].

Johnson, Paul. *Modern Times*. New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1991.

---. *A History of the American People*. New York: Harper Perennial, 1999.

Joint Advanced Warfighting School, Joint Forces Staff College. “Strategic Communication and US Public Diplomacy,” Operational Art and Campaigning Primer AY09-10.

Joint Staff. *Joint Publication 1-02: DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Term*. Washington, DC: Joint Doctrine Division, J7, 19 August 2009.

Kepel, Gilles and Milelli, Jean-Pierre editors. *Al Qaeda In Its Own Words*. Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2008.

Kinzer, Stephen. *All the Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror*. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 2008.

Lacey, Jim, ed. *The Canons of Jihad: Terrorists' Strategy for Defeating America*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2008.

Lamb, Christopher and Cinnamond, Martin. “Unity of Effort: Key to Success in Afghanistan,” Strategic Forum, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, No. 248, October 2009.

Lambert, Stephen. *Y: The Sources of Islamic Revolutionary Conduct*. Washington: Center for Strategic Intelligence Research, 2005.

Ledeen, Michael. *The War Against the Terror Masters: Why It Happened. Where We Are Now. How We'll Win*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 2002.

---. *The Iranian Time Bomb*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 2007.

Levering, Ralph. *The Public and American Foreign Policy, 1918-1978*. New York: William Morrow and Company, 1978.

Lewis, Bernard. *From Babel to Dragomans: Interpreting the Middle East*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004.

Lewis, C.S. *The Screwtape Letters*. Revised Paperback Edition. New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1982.

Longley, Robert. “U.S. Birth Rate Hits All-Time Low,” About.com.
<http://usgovinfo.about.com/cs/censusstatistic/a/aabirthrate.htm> [accessed 9 December 2009].

MacAskill, Ewen. "UN approves 'unprecedented' sanctions against North Korea over nuclear test," [guardian.co.uk](http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/jun/12/un-north-korea-nuclear-sanctions), 12 June 2009.

<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/jun/12/un-north-korea-nuclear-sanctions> [accessed 27 February 2010].

McNeill, Jena Baker and Carafano, James Jay. "Terrorist Watch: 23 Plots Foiled Since 9/11." Backgrounder #2294, The Heritage Foundation, July 2, 2009. <http://www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandSecurity/bg2294.cfm> [accessed 2 November 2009].

Michaels, Jim. "19,000 Insurgents Killed in Iraq Since 2003," *USA Today*, 27 September 2007.

Mullen, Mike, Admiral. "Strategic Communications: Getting Back to the Basics," Joint Chiefs of Staff, 28 August 2009. <http://www.jcs.mil/newsarticle.aspx?ID=142> [accessed 7 March 2010].

NEFA Foundation. "The North Carolina Jihad Cell and the Quantico Marine Base Plot." <http://www.nefafoundation.org/targetamerica.html#quantico> [accessed 1 December 2009].

Naji, Kasra. *Ahmadinejad: The Secret History of Iran's Radical Leader*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008.

New York Times. "Obama's Address on the War in Afghanistan," 1 December 2009. http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/02/world/asia/02prexy.text.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1 [accessed 31 January 2010].

Newsmax. "Recent Cases Show Challenge of US Terrorists," 17 March 2010. <http://newsmax.com/Newsfront/US-American-Jihadists/2010/03/17/id/353054> [accessed 17 March 2010].

Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Department of State. *Our Mission*. <http://www.state.gov/s//ct/about/c16570.htm> [accessed 9 January 2010].

Otterman, Sharon. "Saudi Arabia; Withdrawal of US Forces," Council on Foreign Relations, 2 May 2003. http://www.cfr.org/publication/7739/saudi_arabia.html [accessed 26 January 2010].

Pew Research Center for the People and the Press. "Military Action A Higher Priority Than Homeland Defense," 27 September 2001. <http://people-press.org/report/?pageid=101> [accessed 1 March 2010].

---. "Americans and Europeans Differ Widely on Foreign Policy Issues," 17 April 2002. <http://people-press.org/report/153/americans-and-europeans-differ-widely-on-foreign-policy-issues> [accessed 1 March 2010].

- . "Domestic Concerns will Vie with Terrorism in Fall," 27 June 2002. <http://people-press.org/report/?pageid=621> [accessed 1 March 2010].
- . "One Year Later: New Yorkers More Troubled, Washingtonians More On Edge," 5 September 2002. <http://people-press.org/report/160/one-year-later-new-yorkers-more-troubled-washingtonians-more-on-edge> [accessed 2 March 2010].
- . "Public Wants Proof of Iraqi Weapons Programs," 16 January 2003. <http://people-press.org/report/170/public-wants-proof-of-iraqi-weapons-programs> [accessed 1 March 2010].
- . "Public Confidence In War Effort Falters," 25 March 2003. <http://people-press.org/report/177/public-confidence-in-war-effort-falters> [accessed 1 March 2010].
- . "President's Criticism of Media Resonates, But Iraq Unease Grows," 21 October 2003. <http://people-press.org/report/195/presidents-criticism-of-media-resonates-but-iraq-unease-grows> [accessed 1 March 2010].
- . "More Optimism on Iraq, But Most Expect Long U.S. Stay," February 24, 2005. <http://people-press.org/report/237/more-optimism-on-iraq-but-most-expect-long-us-stay> [accessed 2 March 2010].
- . "Public Support for Afghan Mission Slips: But Most See Possible Taliban Takeover as Major Threat," 22 September 2009. <http://people-press.org/report/546/afghanistan> [accessed 2 March 2010].
- . "Obama Image Unscathed By Terrorism Controversy," 14 January 2010. <http://people-press.org/report/578/> [accessed 2 March 1010].
- Phares, Walid. *The War of Ideas: Jihadism Against Democracy*. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007.
- Phillips, Melanie. *Londonistan*. New York: Encounter Books, 2006.
- Press Room, Department of Treasury. "Treasury Designates Al-Qaeda Member," 15 October 2009. <http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/tg319.htm> [accessed 8 January 2010].
- Queen of Swords. "Ahmadinejad's Threats to Destroy Israel." <http://queenofswords.wordpress.com/2007/03/08/ahmadinejads-threats-to-destroy-israel/> [accessed 21 October 2009].
- Reagan, Ronald, President. "Evil Empire Speech," 8 March 1983. <http://www.nationalcenter.org/ReaganEvilEmpire1983.html> [accessed 23 February 2010].

Robb, John. *Brave New War: The Next Stage of Terrorism and the End of Globalization*. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 2007.

Roberts, Sam. "Birth Rate Is Said to Fall as a Result of Recession," New York Times, 6 Aug 2009. <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/07/us/07births.html> [accessed 9 Dec 2009].

Roggio, Bill. "US Sanctions Iranian General for Aiding Iraqi Terror Groups," Long War Journal [16 September 2008].

http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2008/09/us_sanctions_iranian.php [accessed 27 February 2010].

Rosenberg, Joel. *Inside the Revolution: How the Followers of Jihad, Jefferson, and Jesus are Battling to Dominate the Middle East and Transform the World*. Carol Stream, IL: Tyndale House Publishers, 2009.

Schaefer, Brett and Kim, Anthony. "How Do U.S. Foreign Aid Recipients Vote at the U.N.? Against the U.S." Heritage Foundation, 18 August 2008.

<http://www.heritage.org/research/internationalorganizations/bg2171.cfm> [accessed 27 February 2010].

Senate Committee on Armed Services. Nomination of Admiral Michael G. Mullen, USN, for Reappointment to the Grade of Admiral and Reappointment as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, September 15, 2009, 111th Cong., 1st sess., 2009. <http://armed-services.senate.gov/Transcripts/2009/09%20September/09-61%20-%209-15-09.pdf> [accessed 21 October 2009].

Solomon, Jay. "U.S. Woos Damascus by Easing Export Ban," Wall Street Journal, 28 July 2009. <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124873789302385169.html> [accessed 27 February 2010].

---. "Training for the Civilian Surge," Wall Street Journal, 18 December 2009. <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB126109820281496435.html> [accessed 4 February 2010].

Springer, Devin R., Regens, James L., and Edger, David N. *Islamic Radicalism and Global Jihad*. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2009.

Stalinsky, Steve. "The Iranian Threat: Ayatollah Ali Khamenei," *New York Sun*, 9 February 2005.

Steinhauser, Paul. "Poll: Support for Afghan war at all-time low," *Cable News Network*, 15 September 2009.

<http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/09/15/afghan.war.poll/index.html> [accessed 18 January 2010].

Steyn, Mark. *America Alone: The End of the World as We Know It*. Washington, D.C.: Regnery Publishing, Inc., 2006.

Tanner, Stephen. *Afghanistan: A Military History from Alexander the Great to the Fall of the Taliban*. New York: Da Capo Press, 2002.

The Third Jihad. “The Third Jihad: Radical Islam’s Vision for America,” PublicScope Films, 2008.

Trahan, Jason. “Muslim Brotherhood's papers detail plan to seize U.S.,” Dallas Morning News, 17 September 2007.

<http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dws/news/localnews/stories/091707dnmetborthood.35ce2b6.html> [accessed 16 February 2010].

US Customs and Immigration Enforcement. “ICE Removes Al Qaeda-Linked Terrorist and Convicted Criminals Out of the U.S.,” 17 December 2009.

<http://www.ice.gov/pi/nr/0912/091217washington.htm> [accessed 31 January 2010].

US Department of Justice. *Stewards of the American Dream: FY 2007-2012 Strategic Plan*. <http://www.justice.gov/jmd/mps/strategic2007-2012/index.html> [accessed 9 January 2010].

US News and World Report. “President Obama’s Speech on Afghanistan and Pakistan,” 27 March 2009. <http://www.usnews.com/articles/news/2009/03/27/president-obamas-speech-on-afghanistan-and-pakistan.html> [accessed 31 January 2010].

US Senate. Senate Joint Resolution 23: A joint resolution to authorize the use of United States Armed Forces against those responsible for the recent attacks launched against the United States, Library of Congress, 18 September 2001. <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d107:s.j.res.00023> [accessed 1 March 2010].

United States Joint Forces Command. *The Joint Operating Environment*. Suffolk, VA: Center for Joint Futures (J59), 2008. Available at <https://us.jfcom.mil/sites/J5/j59/default.aspx>.

Voice of America News. “Russia Opposes ‘Paralyzing’ Sanctions Against Iran,” 24 February 2010. <http://waronterrornews.typepad.com/home/2010/02/russia-opposes-paralyzing-sanctions-against-iran.html> [accessed 27 February 2010].

WAVY.com. “DoD: Reports of Sex Assault Up in 2009,” 16 March 2010. <http://www.wavy.com/dpp/military/DOD-Releases-Annual-Sexual-Assault-Response-and-Prevention-Report-> [accessed 28 March 2010].

Warner, Margaret. “Connections Between Radical Cleric, Hasan Closely Examined,” PBS News Hour, 12 November 2009. http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/religion/july-dec09/imam_11-12.html [accessed 30 January 2010].

The White House. *National Security Strategy*, March 2006.

The White House, “Department of State and Other International Programs, The President’s Budget FY2011 Fact Sheet.”

http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/factsheet_department_state/ [accessed 27 February 2010].

Wire reports. “Obama Orders Reforms After Security Failures,” *Virginian Pilot*, 8 January 2010.

Wright, Lawrence. *The Looming Tower: Al Qaeda and the Road to 9/11*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006.

Zarif, Maseh and Majidyar, Ahmad. “Iranian Influence in Afghanistan: Recent Developments” Iran News Digest, 25 August 2009.

<http://wwwirannewsdigestcom/2009/08/25/iranian-influence-in-afghanistan-recent-developments/> [accessed 7 December 2009].

Zissis, Carin and Bajoria, Jayshree. “Pakistan’s Tribal Areas,” Council on Foreign Relations, 26 October 2007.

http://www.cfr.org/publication/11973/tribal_areas_of_pakistan.html?breadcrumb=%2Fissue%2F135%2Fterrorism [accessed 29 November 2009].

Lieutenant Colonel Matthew E. Travis, United States Marine Corps

The author was most recently the Commanding Officer, Combat Logistics Battalion Five (CLB-5), 1st Marine Logistics Group, I Marine Expeditionary Force, Camp Pendleton, CA, where he deployed to provide direct support logistics to Regimental Combat Team One during Operation Iraqi Freedom from August 2008 – March 2009. He was commissioned at Purdue University in December 1988 before completing The Basic School and Engineer Officer Course. He then served as Platoon Commander, 9th Engineer Support Battalion, Okinawa, and deployed with Marine Air Ground Task Force 4-90 to the Philippines. He later attended the Amphibious Warfare School before serving as Company Commander, 2nd Combat Engineer Battalion, 2nd Marine Division, followed by a tour as Assistant Inspector Instructor, 6th Engineer Support Battalion. He then completed the US Army Command and General Staff College and School of Advanced Military Studies, before serving as Operational Planner, Future Operations, G-3/III MEF where he deployed to Thailand/Combined Support Force 536 for tsunami relief and to Afghanistan in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. Following a tour as Executive Officer, Headquarters and Service Battalion, Marine Corps Base, Camp Smedley D. Butler, Okinawa, he then transferred to CLB-5.